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ABSTRACT
This Article empirically demonstrates that police departments’
internal disciplinary procedures, often established through the
collective bargaining process, can serve as barriers to officer
accountability.
Policymakers have long relied on a handful of external legal
mechanisms like the exclusionary rule, civil litigation, and criminal
prosecution to incentivize reform in American police departments. In
theory, these external legal mechanisms should increase the costs borne
by police departments in cases of officer misconduct, forcing rational
police supervisors to enact rigorous disciplinary procedures. But these
external mechanisms have failed to bring about organizational change
in local police departments. This Article argues that state labor law may
partially explain this failure. Most states permit police officers to
bargain collectively over the terms of their employment, including the
content of internal disciplinary procedures. This means that police
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union contracts—largely negotiated outside of public view—shape the
content of disciplinary procedures used by American police
departments.
By collecting and analyzing an original dataset of 178 union
contracts from many of the nation’s largest police departments, this
Article shows how these agreements can frustrate police accountability
efforts. A substantial number of these agreements limit officer
interrogations after alleged misconduct, mandate the destruction of
disciplinary records, ban civilian oversight, prevent anonymous
civilian complaints, indemnify officers in the event of civil suits, and
limit the length of internal investigations. In light of these findings, this
Article theorizes that the structure of the collective bargaining process
may contribute to the prevalence of these problematic procedures. It
concludes by considering how states could amend labor laws to
increase transparency and community participation in the negotiation
of police union contracts.
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INTRODUCTION
In October 2014, police encountered seventeen-year-old Laquan
McDonald carrying a three-inch blade and breaking into vehicles in
southwest Chicago.1 Officers on the scene claimed that McDonald
advanced toward them, swinging the knife in an “aggressive,
exaggerated manner,”2 forcing Officer Jason Van Dyke to shoot and
kill McDonald in self-defense.3 Like most of the other estimated 1110
civilians killed by police officers in 2014,4 McDonald’s death initially
received little media attention. That all changed in November 2015,
when a county judge ordered Chicago officials to release dash-camera
footage of the event.5 The video shocked many Chicago residents and
spurred a federal investigation of the Chicago Police Department.6
The video showed that McDonald never charged the officers.7 In
fact, McDonald appeared to be walking away from them when Van

1. Steve Mills et al., Laquan McDonald Police Reports Differ Dramatically from Video,
CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 5, 2015, 1:25 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-laquan-mcdonaldchicago-police-reports-met-20151204-story.html [https://perma.cc/YWY9-B5RE]; Stacy St. Clair,
Jeff Coen & Todd Lighty, Officers in Laquan McDonald Shooting Taken off Streets—14 Months
Later, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 22, 2016), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/editorials/ctchicago-police-laquan-mcdonald-officers-20160121-story.html
[https://perma.cc/JL9M-C2NV]
(explaining how the discrepancies between the police reports and the dash-cam footage in the
Laquan McDonald case ultimately resulted in the officers involved being taken off the streets).
2. Mills et al., supra note 1.
3. Id. (noting that in the police reports, the officers involved referred to Officer Jason Van
Dyke as VD and called McDonald “O,” shorthand for “offender”). Even after McDonald fell to
the ground, officers claimed that he attempted to lift himself up and pointed the knife at them,
prompting Van Dyke to fire several additional shots. Id. Based on these reports, Van Dyke’s
supervisor ruled McDonald’s death a justifiable homicide. Id.
4. There are currently no national statistics on the number of individuals killed by police
officers each year. Media outlets and private individuals have attempted to fill this gap by
crowdsourcing and scouring media sources for reports of these sorts of deaths. See, e.g., Killed by
Police 2014, KILLED BY POLICE, http://www.killedbypolice.net/kbp2014.html [https://perma.cc/
MS9Z-2VYV] (estimating the total number of verifiable killings of individuals by police officers
in 2014 at 1111, including Laquan McDonald’s death).
5. Carol Marin & Don Mosely, Judge Orders Release of Video Showing Shooting Death of
Chicago Teen, NBC CHI. (Nov. 19, 2015, 2:59 PM), http://www.nbcchicago.com/news/nationalinternational/Judge-to-Decide-on-Release-of-Laquan-McDonald-Video-351741261.html
[https://perma.cc/EQX8-XNMJ] (“Cook County Judge Franklin Valderrama told a packed
courtroom Thursday the department must reveal the dashcam footage that capture[d] the death
of 17-year-old Laquan McDonald in October 2014 at the hands of a white police officer.”).
6. Monica Davey & Mitch Smith, Justice Officials to Investigate Chicago Police Department
After Laquan McDonald Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/
12/07/us/justice-dept-expected-to-investigate-chicago-police-after-laquan-mcdonald-case.html
[https://perma.cc/5YWL-DKVG].
7. Id.

RUSHIN IN PRINTER FINAL V.2 (DO NOT DELETE)

1194

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

1/28/2018 11:13 PM

[Vol. 66:1191

Dyke exited his vehicle and shot McDonald sixteen times in fourteen
seconds from a distance of ten to fifteen feet.8 Perhaps most
egregiously, the video showed Van Dyke firing multiple shots into
McDonald’s lifeless body as “white puffs of smoke bec[a]me visible.”9
This was not the first time Van Dyke’s behavior should have raised
red flags. Since 2001, he had been the subject of more than twenty
civilian complaints, including ten complaints about excessive use of
force, two involving the use of firearms and one alleging the use of a
racial slur.10 Van Dyke had more complaints than 96.7 percent of all
Chicago police officers over that time period.11 Although Van Dyke
had never before faced criminal charges, a jury awarded one man
$350,000 after determining that Van Dyke “employed excessive force
during a traffic stop.”12 Despite all of this, the Chicago Police

8. Jason Meisner, Jeremy Gorner & Steve Schmadeke, Chicago Releases Dash-Cam Video
of Fatal Shooting After Cop Charged with Murder, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 24, 2015, 7:14 PM),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-chicago-cop-shooting-video-laquan-mcdonald-charges20151124-story.html [https://perma.cc/X258-3FEA] (citing the number of shots fired by Van Dyke
in a short period of time); Josh Sanburn, Chicago Releases Video of Laquan McDonald Shooting,
TIME (Nov. 24, 2015), http://time.com/4126670/chicago-releases-video-of-laquan-mcdonaldshooting [https://perma.cc/2KVT-ZJLF] (“The deadly incident occurred just before 10 p.m. on
Oct. 20, 2014, after police were told that an individual was carrying a knife and breaking into
vehicles on Chicago’s Southwest Side. Officers also reported that McDonald slashed the tires of
a squad car before the shooting occurred.”).
9. Sanburn, supra note 8. Soon thereafter, protesters filled the streets of downtown
Chicago. Monica Davey & Mitch Smith, Chicago Protests Mostly Peaceful After Video of Police
Shooting Is Released, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/25/us/
chicago-officer-charged-in-death-of-black-teenager-official-says.html [https://perma.cc/9FYWRKPJ] (explaining that “protesters led clusters of police officers on a march through the streets
of Chicago’s Loop, blocking intersections, chanting outside a police station and, along a major
road to the city’s largest highways, unfurling a banner that cited deaths at the hands of the
police”). It is also worth mentioning that the shooting of Laquan McDonald appeared to have
contributed to the initiation of a federal investigation of the Chicago Police Department by the
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) under 42 U.S.C. § 14141. Davey & Smith, supra note 6
(describing the shooting of Laquan McDonald by a Chicago police officer). Van Dyke is now
facing murder charges for McDonald’s death, and Chicago’s Fraternal Order of Police has hired
Van Dyke as a janitor as he awaits trial. Police Union Hires Officer Charged in Laquan McDonald
Slaying as Janitor, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 31, 2016, 2:18 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/
laquanmcdonald/ct-jason-van-dyke-police-union-job-20160331-story.html [https://perma.cc/P4
DR-BFN6].
10. Elliot C. McLaughlin, Chicago Officer Had History of Complaints Before Laquan
McDonald Shooting, CNN (Nov. 26, 2015, 5:45 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/25/us/jasonvan-dyke-previous-complaints-lawsuits [https://perma.cc/VQ86-TV2T].
11. Of the approximately 12,000 officers working for the Chicago Police Department (CPD),
402, or 3.35 percent, had twenty or more complaints over this time period. Id.
12. Id.
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Department had never pursued disciplinary action against Van Dyke.13
In fact, Chicago officials had not even flagged Van Dyke’s behavior as
potentially problematic.14
This lack of corrective action in cases of systemic officer
misconduct is, in part, a consequence of public-employee labor law.
Like most states, Illinois permits police officers “to bargain collectively
with regard to policy matters directly affecting wages, hours and terms
and conditions of employment.”15 Courts have interpreted phrases like
“terms and conditions of employment” in Illinois and elsewhere to
permit or require the negotiation of internal procedures used by police
management to investigate or punish officers suspected of
misconduct.16
As part of its collective bargaining agreement with the Fraternal
Order of Police, the union representing police officers, the City of
Chicago has agreed “to erase decades worth of records that document
complaints against police officers and the resolution of these
complaints.”17 Because of this, Chicago’s Independent Police Review

13. Id. (“Five complaints in the database were ‘not sustained,’ five were unfounded, four
resulted in exoneration, five had unknown outcomes and one resulted in no action taken.”).
14. Editorial, Save the Police Conduct Records, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 16, 2015,
5:20
PM),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/editorials/ct-chicago-police-unionrecords-edit-1217-20151216-story.html [https://perma.cc/UGA2-4TYM] [hereinafter Save the
Police Conduct Records] (“That’s how the system failed to flag Officer Jason Van Dyke, whose
tally of complaints rose to 20 when the database was last updated. Half of those complaints
concerned use of force, but Van Dyke was never disciplined or even flagged as a potential
problem.”).
15. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 315/4 (2014), invalidated in part on other grounds by Heaton
v. Quinn, 32 N.E.3d 1 (Ill. 2015).
16. See infra Part I.A.
17. Save the Police Conduct Records, CHI. TRIB. supra note 14. The police department
initially pushed back against civilian attempts to view personnel files. After a prolonged court
battle, an appellate judge ruled that the Illinois Freedom of Information Act trumped the CPD’s
collective bargaining agreement, requiring the release of these personnel files. Rob Wildeboer,
Complaints Against Chicago Cops Published After 20-Year Saga, WBEZ CHI. (Nov. 10, 2015),
http://www.wbez.org/news/complaints-against-chicago-cops-published-after-20-year-saga-113715
[https://perma.cc/EZJ2-CBBY] (explaining how after seven years of litigation, University of
Chicago law professor Craig Futterman won a protective order requiring Chicago to release a
portion of its police disciplinary records from the period between 2001 and 2015). The records
showed that the CPD had determined that 95.34 percent of the 56,384 citizen complaints were
unsubstantiated and required no action. Findings, CITIZENS POLICE DATA PROJECT,
http://cpdb.co/findings [https://perma.cc/D25N-F8KV]. The most common punishment in the
small number of substantiated complaints was a short suspension or letter of reprimand. Id. Black
residents filed 61 percent of complaints but accounted for only 25 percent of sustained complaints;
for white residents, the figures were 21 percent and 58 percent respectively. Id.
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Authority does not consider an officer’s history of complaints when
examining a new complaint against the same officer.18 The Chicago
union contract also delays interrogations of officers involved in alleged
wrongdoing19 and prevents the investigation of most anonymous
complaints.20 Perhaps it is no coincidence that less than 2 percent of all
civilian complaints against Chicago police officers result in any sort of
disciplinary action.21
Chicago is hardly alone. In recent years, civil rights advocates have
uncovered a number of collective bargaining agreements that provide
frontline officers with a laundry list of procedural protections during
internal investigations. For example, Baltimore’s police union

The data also revealed that the police department did not provide adequate oversight of
police officers. A large number of complaints were directed at a small number of officers (less
than 10 percent of the CPD). Id. The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) was in a similar
position in 1991. While the vast majority of LAPD officers had only one or two allegations of
excessive force against them, some 183 officers had four or more allegations; forty-four had six or
more; sixteen had eight or more; and one had sixteen. INDEP. COMM’N ON THE L.A. POLICE
DEP’T, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE LOS ANGELES POLICE
DEPARTMENT 36 (1991) [hereinafter CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT]. Likewise, a small
cohort of officers was involved in many of the department’s use-of-force cases. Id. at 36. The CPD
and LAPD cases are consistent with the belief among many academics that “10 percent of . . .
officers cause 90 percent of the problems.” Samuel Walker, Geoffrey P. Alpert & Dennis J.
Kenney, Early Warning Systems: Responding to the Problem Police Officer, NAT’L INST. JUST.
RES. BRIEF, July 2001, at 1, http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/188565.pdf [https://perma.cc/873TV4AP].
18. Save the Police Conduct Records, CHI. TRIB. supra note 14.
19. CITY OF CHI., AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY OF CHICAGO DEPARTMENT OF POLICE
AND THE FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE CHICAGO LODGE NO. 7, at 6 (June 2, 2012) (on file
with the Duke Law Journal) (“The interview shall be postponed for a reasonable time, but in no
case more than forty-eight (48) hours from the time the Officer is informed of the request for an
interview and the general subject matter thereof and his or her counsel or representative can be
present.”).
20. Id. at 4 (“No anonymous complaint made against an Officer shall be made the subject of
a Complaint Register investigation unless the allegation is a violation of the Illinois Criminal
Code, the criminal code of another state of the United States or a criminal violation of a federal
statute.”).
21. CITIZENS POLICE DATA PROJECT, supra note 17 (showing that 2 percent of the 28,567
civilian complaints submitted between 2011 and 2015 resulted in discipline). It is also worth noting
that the DOJ has released an investigative findings report that finds the Chicago Police
Department is engaged in a pattern or practice of unconstitutional misconduct in violation of 42
U.S.C. § 14141. The parties have since agreed to negotiate in good faith a consent decree to
remedy these problems. Rebecca Hersher, DOJ: ‘Severely Deficient Training’ Has Led to Pattern
of Abuse by Chicago Police, NPR (Jan. 13, 2017), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/
01/13/509646186/doj-severely-deficient-training-has-led-to-pattern-of-abuse-by-chicago-police
[https://perma.cc/J859-VWYU].
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contract22 includes provisions that allow for the expungement of officer
performance records,23 bar the public disclosure of disciplinary
actions,24 and limit civilian oversight of police officers.25 And in
Cleveland, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) found it challenging
to investigate the Cleveland Police Department in part because its

22. On the morning of April 12, 2015, Baltimore police arrested a twenty-five-year-old
African American man named Freddie Gray for allegedly possessing an illegal switchblade. Eyder
Peralta, Timeline: What We Know About the Freddie Gray Arrest, NPR (May 1, 2015,
8:23 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/05/01/403629104/baltimore-protestswhat-we-know-about-the-freddie-gray-arrest [https://perma.cc/4B6G-8GQ2] (explaining that the
prosecutor later confirmed that the knife was not illegal, making the stop illegal). Officers claimed
that they did not use significant force in arresting Gray—a claim that is “mostly corroborated by
video shot by bystanders.” David A. Graham, The Mysterious Death of Freddie Gray, ATLANTIC
(Apr. 22, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/the-mysterious-death-offreddie-gray/391119 [https://perma.cc/Z3VY-C6KB]. Video and eyewitness testimony do seem to
confirm that Gray screamed in pain during the arrest and his legs appeared to be injured as police
placed him in a police van. Gray also apparently requested his inhaler during the arrest—a request
officers denied. Id. By the time Gray arrived at the police station “a half hour later, he was unable
to breathe or talk, suffering from wounds that would kill him” the following week. Id. Gray had
suffered a grave spinal injury similar to that experienced in serious car accidents. Scott Dance,
Freddie Gray’s Spinal Injury Suggests ‘Forceful Trauma,’ Doctors Say, BALT. SUN (Apr. 21, 2015),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/health/bs-hs-gray-injuries-20150420-story.html [https://perma.cc/
NBH8-4554]. Gray’s death led to criminal charges against the officers involved. See Jess Bidgood,
Freddie Gray Trials Resume with Prosecution of 2nd Baltimore Officer, N.Y. TIMES (May
12, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/13/us/freddie-gray-trials-resume-with-prosecution-of2nd-baltimore-officer.html [https://perma.cc/WR9D-54XL] (“Six police officers were charged in
the events that preceded the death of Mr. Gray.”). But prosecutors eventually dropped the
charges against the officers. Kevin Rector, Charges Dropped, Freddie Gray Case Concludes with
Zero Convictions Against Officers, BALT. SUN. (July 27, 2016, 8:57 PM), http://www.
baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-ci-miller-pretrial-motions-20160727-story.
html [https://perma.cc/HY9M-ZR8C].
Questions surrounding the investigation of this incident inspired civil rights advocates to
take a closer look at the Baltimore police union contract, which governs such investigations. See
generally SAMUEL WALKER, THE BALTIMORE POLICE UNION CONTRACT AND THE LAW
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS’S BILL OF RIGHTS: IMPEDIMENTS TO ACCOUNTABILITY (2015), http://
s3.documentcloud.org/documents/2086432/baltimore-police-union-contract.pdf [https://perma.
cc/SYZ8-VRUX] (examining the ways that the Baltimore police union contract may impede
effective investigation of police misconduct).
23. WALKER, supra note 22, at 5 (citing “Article 16, Paragraph O of the Baltimore union
contract,” which “provides that after three years an officer can request” deletion of formal
complaints from his or her personnel file).
24. Id. at 7 (citing Article 16, Paragraph K, which states that “notice of disciplinary actions
may not be made public”).
25. CITY OF BALT., MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE CITY OF
BALTIMORE POLICE DEPARTMENT AND THE BALTIMORE CITY LODGE NO. 3, FRATERNAL
ORDER OF POLICE, INC. UNIT I, at 22 (2015) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (stating that
“[n]o civilians other than an Administrative Law Judge may serve on a Departmental Hearing
Board”).
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collective bargaining contract mandated the removal of disciplinary
records from department databases after two years.26
These examples bolster the hypothesis that some union contract
provisions may impede effective investigations of police misconduct
and shield problematic officers from discipline.27 Although this
hypothesis is gaining popularity,28 virtually no comprehensive
empirical work has examined the prevalence of such provisions in
police union contracts across the country. This lack of research is
troubling, as the majority of American police officers are part of labor
unions that collectively bargain for the terms of their employment.29
To begin filling this gap in the existing literature, this Article
analyzes an original dataset of 178 collective bargaining agreements
that govern the working conditions of around 40 percent of municipal
officers in states that permit or require collective bargaining in police
departments.30 This analysis reveals that a substantial number of these
contracts unreasonably interfere with or otherwise limit the
effectiveness of mechanisms designed to hold police officers
accountable for their actions. For example, many of these contracts
limit officer interrogations after alleged wrongdoing,31 mandate the
destruction of officer disciplinary records,32 ban civilian oversight of
police misconduct,33 prevent anonymous civilian complaints,34
indemnify officers in civil suits,35 or require arbitration in cases of
disciplinary action.36
These findings suggest that state labor law may pose a greater
barrier to police reform than scholars have previously recognized. For

26. Rosa Flores & Mallory Simon, Chicago’s Next Fight: Trying to Purge Police Misconduct
Records, CNN (Dec. 20, 2015, 1:58 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/18/us/chicago-policemisconduct-records [https://perma.cc/GTM5-QD3T].
27. See WALKER, supra note 22, at 1 (“In Baltimore, and in other cities and counties across
the country, police-union contracts contain provisions that impede the effective investigation of
reported misconduct and shield officers who are in fact guilty of misconduct from meaningful
discipline.”). For a discussion of existing research which has hypothesized that there is a link
between police-union contracts and limitations on police accountability, see infra Part II.
28. See infra Part II.
29. See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
30. For more information on the methodology used in this Article, see infra Part III.
31. See infra Part IV.A
32. See infra Part IV.B.
33. See infra Part IV.C.
34. See infra Part IV.D.
35. See infra note 135 and accompanying text.
36. See infra note 135 and accompanying text.
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decades, policymakers have based reform efforts on a handful of
external legal mechanisms including the exclusionary rule, civil
litigation, criminal prosecution, and structural reform litigation. These
external mechanisms supposedly give police departments incentives to
enact internal reforms aimed at protecting the constitutional rights of
criminal suspects. In theory, these external legal mechanisms should
increase the costs borne by police departments in cases of officer
misconduct. For instance, when faced with a significant civil judgment
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, rational police supervisors should respond by
punishing any officers who engage in wrongdoing that could give rise
to a similar judgment in the future.37
But across many of the nation’s largest cities, supervisors cannot
easily respond to external legal pressure by punishing problematic
officers or implementing rigorous disciplinary procedures. Instead,
many courts have held that internal-investigation and disciplinary
procedures are appropriate subjects for collective bargaining under
public-employee labor laws.38 This collective bargaining process
happens largely outside of the public view and with minimal input from
community stakeholders most at risk of experiencing police
misconduct.39
In light of these findings, this Article argues that states should
amend labor laws to increase transparency and community
participation in the development of police disciplinary procedures. To
be clear, municipalities ought to provide police officers with adequate
due process protections during internal investigations. It is also
important for frontline police officers to have a voice in the
development of internal policies and procedures to reduce the
probability of organizational resistance. However, these internal
disciplinary protections should not be so burdensome as to thwart
legitimate efforts to investigate or punish officers engaged in
wrongdoing.
This Article suggests several different ways that states could
increase transparency and public participation in the development of
police disciplinary procedures. States could require municipalities and

37. See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 64–68 and accompanying text.
39. See PRIYA M. ABRAHAM, OPENING THE CURTAIN ON GOVERNMENT UNIONS
5–8 (2015), http://www.commonwealthfoundation.org/docLib/20150609_CBTransparency.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H9Z5-7PHM] (providing links to various state statutes that limit public
participation and transparency in collective bargaining negotiations).
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police unions to negotiate disciplinary procedures in public hearings
rather than behind closed doors. Alternatively, states could require
municipalities to establish notice-and-comment procedures, similar to
those employed by administrative agencies, before agreeing to a
package of disciplinary procedures via the collective bargaining
process. Perhaps most radically, states could amend labor laws to
remove police disciplinary procedures from the list of appropriate
subjects for collective bargaining. This Article concludes by
considering some of the benefits and drawbacks of these proposals.
Ultimately, it seeks to reorient the scholarly discussion by fully
recognizing how state labor law complicates police-reform efforts.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I describes the complex
array of modern police labor and employment protections, including
collective bargaining agreements, civil service statutes, and law
enforcement officers’ bills of rights (LEOBRs). Part II explores the
existing literature on collective bargaining agreements in police
departments, and Part III describes the methodology used in this
Article for coding the frequency of problematic disciplinary provisions
in police union contracts. Part IV breaks down the content of collective
bargaining agreements in some of the largest police departments in the
United States. Finally, Part V makes some normative
recommendations regarding how policymakers could increase
transparency and public participation in the development of police
disciplinary procedures.
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I. POLICE LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT PROTECTIONS
Numerous criminal law scholars have written on the merits of the
exclusionary rule,40 civil litigation,41 criminal prosecution,42 and

40. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (extending the exclusionary rule to
wrongdoing by state and local police); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949), (declining to
extend the exclusionary rule to states), overruled by Mapp, 367 U.S. 643; Silverthorne Lumber
Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 390–92 (1920) (expanding the exclusionary rule to cover not
just illegally obtained material but also copies of illegally obtained material—the precursor to the
“fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (initially
establishing the exclusionary rule, while limiting its application to federal law enforcement),
overruled by Mapp, 367 U.S. 643. The purpose of the exclusionary rule, the prohibition on the use
of evidence at trial which has been obtained in violation of a defendant’s constitutional rights, is
to deter police from committing such violations by eliminating any benefit that would be achieved.
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
Scholars have split on whether the exclusionary rule contributes to meaningful change in
police departments. See, e.g., William C. Heffernan & Richard W. Lovely, Evaluating the Fourth
Amendment Exclusionary Rule: The Problem of Police Compliance with the Law, 24 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 311, 355 (1991) (suggesting that the exclusionary rule has a meaningful impact on
the likelihood that a police department would adopt reforms); Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Comment,
The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1016, 1017 (1987) (finding that the CPD did respond “to deter—to compel respect
for the constitutional guarantee in the only effective way—by removing the incentive to disregard
it”). But cf. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? 322 (2d ed. 2008) (rejecting the influence of courts in bringing about social change
through mechanisms like the exclusionary rule).
41. Victims of police misconduct can file civil suits in federal court against police officers,
and in some cases police departments or municipalities. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012); see also Monell
v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 700–01 (1978) (establishing that a claimant is permitted to
recover civil penalties from a department based on the unconstitutional actions of an officer
employed by that department under § 1983). Research suggests that § 1983 may have influenced
the availability of insurance for police departments, contributing to policy change. CHARLES R.
EPP, MAKING RIGHTS REAL: ACTIVISTS, BUREAUCRATS, AND THE CREATION OF THE
LEGALISTIC STATE 95 (2009). Nevertheless, some scholars worry that the organization of
municipal government and indemnification policies limit the impact of civil litigation on police
reform. Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 890 (2014) (showing
that indemnification policies are prevalent across American police departments); Samuel Walker
& Morgan Macdonald, An Alternative Remedy for Police Misconduct: A Model State “Pattern or
Practice” Statute, 19 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 479, 495 (2009) (discussing how the organization
of municipal governments lessens the impact of any individual civil settlement on police
departments).
42. See Debra Livingston, Police Reform and the Department of Justice: An Essay on
Accountability, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 815, 842 n.138 (1999) (“[C]riminal law standards define
‘the outer limits of what is permissible in society’—not the good police practices that police
reformers aspire to institute in a wayward department.” (quoting PAUL CHEVIGNY, EDGE OF THE
KNIFE 101 (1995))).
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structural reform litigation43 as tools for police reform.44 Only recently,
however, have legal scholars begun to discuss the incidental impact of
labor and employment law on police behavior.45
This Part evaluates labor and employment laws that affect internal
investigations and disciplinary action in American police departments,
while the latter portions of this Article focus on the content of union
contracts negotiated pursuant to state collective bargaining statutes.46
In the overwhelming majority of states, collective bargaining statutes
give police unions the power to negotiate salaries, benefits, and other
conditions of employment for frontline police officers.47 Courts have
43. See Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private
Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384, 1417 (2000) (offering a
creative way that the DOJ could deputize private citizens to expand 42 U.S.C. § 14141
enforcement). See generally Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive
Policing Reform, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2010) (suggesting a worst-first approach to enforcing
§ 14141); Livingston, supra note 42, at 820. (“Section 14141 represents an important new remedial
tool that offers enhanced opportunities for the radical reform of lax police administrative
practices.”); Stephen Rushin, Federal Enforcement of Police Reform, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3189
(2014) [hereinafter Rushin, Federal Enforcement] (discussing the federal government’s
enforcement of § 14141); Stephen Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation in American Police
Departments, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1343 (2015) (providing an empirical assessment of the use of
§ 14141, a statute that gives the U.S. attorney general the authority to seek equitable relief against
police departments engaged in a pattern or practice of unconstitutional misconduct); Kami Chavis
Simmons, The Politics of Policing: Ensuring Stakeholder Collaboration in the Federal Reform of
Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489 (2008) (making an
argument for more collaboration in § 14141 interventions).
44. Others have written about how private insurers regulate public law enforcement
agencies. See John Rappaport, How Private Insurers Regulate Public Police, 130 HARV. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2017). Still others have discussed how decertifying problematic officers could help
address misconduct. See generally Roger L. Goldman & Steven Puro, Revocation of Police Officer
Certification: A Viable Remedy for Police Misconduct?, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 541, 546 (2001)
(“Without a mechanism at the state or national level to remove the certificate of law enforcement
officials who engage in such misconduct, it is likely that there will be more such instances of
repeated misconduct.”).
45. Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 799 (2012)
(suggesting that labor and employment protections may act as a “tax” on police reform); Seth W.
Stoughton, The Incidental Regulation of Policing, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2179, 2205–17 (2014)
(discussing in broad terms the effect of labor laws and collective bargaining on policing).
46. See infra Part IV.
47. See infra Part I.A. This Article focuses primarily on disciplinary terms found in union
contracts that dictate the working conditions for frontline police officers. Police departments
generally rely on top-down command structures with a police commissioner or chief (or chiefs) at
the top who are responsible for official policymaking. See Catherine L. Fisk & L. Song
Richardson, Police Unions, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 9) (on file
with the Duke Law Journal); see also Peter K. Manning, A Dialectic of Organisational and
Occupational Culture, in POLICE OCCUPATIONAL CULTURE: NEW DEBATES AND DIRECTIONS
49, 70 (Megan O’Neill, Monique Marks & Anne-Marie Singh eds., 2007) (explaining that the top
command in a police department is typically “composed of officers above the rank of
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generally interpreted collective bargaining statutes to permit police
unions to negotiate the methods that management may use to
investigate and punish officers suspected of misconduct.48
It is worth noting, though, that collective bargaining statutes
represent just one part of a larger web of police labor and employment
laws. Several other labor and employment laws also dictate the
disciplinary standards for frontline police officers, including LEOBRs49
and civil service statutes.50 This Part discusses each in turn.
A. Collective Bargaining
Police officers are a relatively new addition to the labor
movement.51 The public initially viewed police unions with some
suspicion—in part because of the “disastrous Boston Police
Department strike of 1919, in which over a thousand officers—about
two-thirds of Boston’s police force at the time—made a bid for higher
pay and better hours by walking off the job or refusing to report for
duty,” resulting in riots, numerous fatalities, and significant property
damage.52 Around the time of the strike in Boston, officers faced
deplorable working conditions. Although Boston had voted to give
police officers a raise in 1898, it was not put into effect until 1913.53
Even then, officers still earned meager wages for long hours. In the
years leading up to the strike, experienced Boston police officers
typically earned around $1200 a year and no officer could earn more
than $1400 a year, even though officers had to buy their own uniforms

superintendent (or commander) including chief, and deputy chief or assistant chief”). The
significant “bulk of the department consists of the rank and file, who sit at the bottom of the
organization.” Fisk & Richardson, supra (manuscript at 9).
48. Fisk & Richardson, supra note 47 (manuscript at 25).
49. See infra Part I.C.
50. See infra Part I.B.
51. Stoughton, supra note 45, at 2206.
52. Id. For more information on the 1919 strike of the Boston Police Department, see
generally JOSEPH E. SLATER, PUBLIC WORKERS: GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE UNIONS, THE LAW,
AND THE STATE: 1900–1962 (2004). As Slater chronicles, in September of 1919, “practically all of
Boston’s police officers went on strike,” concerned primarily with their wages, hours, and working
conditions. Crowds of thousands of people then went on “a looting spree.” A group of rioters
chanted “[k]ill them all” at a group of reserve park police. State guards were eventually brought
in to quell the riot, resulting in officers firing “point-blank into the crowds, killing 9 and wounding
23 others.” Id. at 13–14. When peace was ultimately restored, all 1147 striking officers were fired.
This event would become infamous. Court opinions, labor opponents, and policymakers
frequently cited the Boston strike “as a cautionary tale of the evils of such [police] unions.” Id.
53. See id. at 25.
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at a cost of $200.54 Day-shift officers typically worked seventy-three
hours a week, while night-shift officers worked around eighty-three
hours a week; some officers were even forced to work as many as
ninety-eight hours a week.55
So, faced with few options for increasing their pay or improving
their working conditions, a majority of Boston’s police force went on
strike. Rather than helping Boston police, the strike of 1919 led to the
firing of all 1147 officers and was met with widespread public
condemnation.56 It would be decades after the Boston riots before
states finally permitted police officers to unionize.57
Today, though, the tables have turned. A majority of American
states now permit or require municipalities to bargain collectively with
police unions.58 According to the best estimates, around two-thirds of
American police officers are part of a labor union.59 Police unions
generally benefit from broad, bipartisan support—even from
conservative politicians who have fought against unionization for other
government employees.60
Unionization has had some major and undeniable benefits for
frontline officers. The average starting salary for sworn officers in

54. See id.
55. Id. (explaining that some officers were forced to work seventeen-hour days and that
supervisors were limited in their travel or movement on days off).
56. Id. at 14.
57. Fisk & Richardson, supra note 47 (manuscript at 21) (stating that “[u]nions finally
succeeded in gaining a lasting foothold in American police departments in the late 1960s”).
58. According to a recent study, four states—Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and
Virginia—generally prohibit police departments from collectively bargaining. Five states—
Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Mississippi, and Wyoming—have no clear statute or case law that
has settled whether police officers may collectively bargain. The remaining forty-one states
appear to have statutes that generally require or permit local police departments to bargain
collectively with police unions about salaries, benefits, and other terms of employment. MILLA
SANES & JOHN SCHMITT, CTR. FOR ECON. AND POL’Y RES., REGULATION OF PUBLIC SECTOR
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE STATES 7 (2014), http://cepr.net/documents/state-public-cb2014-03.pdf [https://perma.cc/5YSB-YALN].
59. BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 2007,
at 13 (rev. ed. 2011), http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/lpd07.pdf [https://perma.cc/XM4U-55UH]
(showing that around 66 percent of officers are employed by departments that engage in collective
bargaining).
60. Stoughton, supra note 45, at 2207 (“Times have changed, and today police unions enjoy
broad legal and social support.”); A.J. Delgado, It’s Time for Conservatives to Stop Defending
Police, NAT’L REV. (July 21, 2014, 6:10 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/383312/
its-time-conservatives-stop-defending-police-j-delgado [https://perma.cc/PLS2-TWVH] (arguing
that conservatives too often defend police unions while trying to fight against unionization in
other contexts, like public schools).
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police departments with collective bargaining is around 38 percent
higher than in police departments without it.61 Unionization has also
allowed frontline officers to have a greater say in internal policy
matters. The typical police union contract now governs “a broad range
of topics in excruciating detail.”62
State statutes regulating these collective bargaining agreements
typically define their scope broadly, permitting public employees to
negotiate on any “matters of wages, hours, and other conditions of
employment.”63 Courts have generally understood terms like “wages”
to permit public employees to bargain about anything that directly or
indirectly affects their compensation, including direct wages or salaries,
fringe benefits, health insurance, life insurance, retirement benefits,
sick leave, vacation time, and any indirect form of compensation.64
Phrases like “conditions of employment” are trickier to interpret.
If read broadly, this sort of language can become a “catchall phrase

61. REAVES, supra note 59, at 13 (noting that the average salary for entry-level officers was
approximately $10,887 higher in departments with collective bargaining—$39,263 in agencies with
collective bargaining, compared to $28,376 in agencies without it—and that this discrepancy
existed in all population categories).
62. Stoughton, supra note 45, at 2208 (using as examples of the intricate nature of modern
collective bargaining agreements the CPD contract, which is 150 pages long, the Boston Police
Department contract, which is sixty-three pages long, and the New York Police Department
contract, which is twenty-eight pages long). It is also worth mentioning that municipalities
frequently must negotiate with multiple police unions that represent different segments of the
police department. Id. at 2207–08. As an example, Stoughton explains that the City of Dallas must
negotiate with both the “chapter of the Fraternal Order of Police and the Dallas Police
Association.” Id. at 2208. Likewise, the City of New York must negotiate with five different
unions. Id. And in Los Angeles, the city must bargain with eight different unions. Id.
63. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 23.040.070 (2014); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 5-271 (West
2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 1301 (2013); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 447.309 (West 2013); HAW.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 89-9 (LexisNexis 2014); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 315/2 (West 2013); IND.
CODE ANN. § 36-8-22-3 (LexisNexis 2009); IOWA CODE ANN. § 20.9 (West 2010); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 67A.6902 (West 2016); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 150E, § 6 (LexisNexis 2008); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 423.215(1) (West 2016); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179A.06-5 (West 2016); MO. ANN.
STAT. § 105.520 (West 2015); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-31-305(2) (West 2015); NEB. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 48-816 (LexisNexis 2012); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 288.150(2) (LexisNexis 2012); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 273-A:1 (LexisNexis 2016); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.3 (West 2011); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 10-7E-17(A)(1) (2013; N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 204(2) (McKinney 2011); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 4117.03 (West 2016); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 51-101 (West 2012; OR. REV.
STAT. § 243.650(7)(a) (2015); 43 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 217.1 (West 2009); 28 R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 28-9.1-4 (2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 3-18-3 (2013; TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§ 174.002 (West 2016); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-20a-3 (LexisNexis 2015); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§ 1725 (2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 41.56.030 (West 2016).
64. See generally Deborah Tussey, Annotation, Bargainable or Negotiable Issues in State
Public Employment Relations, 84 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 3, at 242 (1978 & Supp. 2015) (analyzing
permissible public-employee bargaining for direct and indirect compensation).
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into which almost any proposal may fall.”65 To limit the scope of
collective bargaining statutes, courts and state labor relations boards
have generally held that managerial prerogatives should not be subject
to negotiation as so-called “conditions of employment.”66
In practice, though, courts have proved fairly deferential to publicemployee unions. Only a handful of courts have examined whether
disciplinary procedures in police departments are considered
“conditions of employment,” thereby making them subject to
collective bargaining. A number of these courts have held that police
disciplinary procedure is an appropriate subject of collective
bargaining.67 Some courts, though, have carved out exceptions for
specific disciplinary topics.68
In sum, political leaders on both sides of the aisle who once
rejected police unionization as a threat to public safety have now
widely embraced it. Collective bargaining has emerged as a major

65. Corpus Christi Fire Fighters Ass’n v. City of Corpus Christi, 10 S.W.3d 723, 727 (Tex.
App. 1999).
66. Tussey, supra note 64, at 242–43. As the American Law Reports has explained:
Perhaps the single greatest . . . limitation on the scope of bargaining or negotiation
by . . . public employees is the concept of managerial prerogative as it has developed in
the public sector. In essence, the concept creates a dichotomy between “bargainable”
issues, that is, those issues which affect conditions of employment, and issues of
“policy” which are exclusively reserved to government discretion and cannot be made
mandatory subjects of bargaining.
Id. at 255–56.
67. See, e.g., City of Casselberry v. Orange Cty. Police Benevolent Ass’n, 482 So. 2d 336, 340
(Fla. 1986) (holding that even though the state civil service law established some procedures for
demotion and discharge, municipalities were still required to bargain collectively on those issues
to the extent necessary to potentially establish alternate grievance procedures); City of Reno v.
Reno Police Protective Ass’n, 653 P.2d 156, 158 (Nev. 1982) (holding that Nevada law requires
municipalities to negotiate with police departments over disciplinary measures); Union Twp. Bd.
of Trs. v. Fraternal Order of Police, Ohio Valley Lodge No. 112, 766 N.E.2d 1027, 1031–32 (Ohio
Ct. App. 2001) (holding that discipline was a mandatory subject of bargaining, so that when the
township refused to bargain, a conciliator could select the union’s proposal on discipline in its
final settlement award).
68. See, e.g., Berkeley Police Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, 143 Cal. Rptr. 255, 260 (Cal. Ct. App.
1977) (affirming the lower court’s judgment and order declining to enjoin the city police
department’s practice of permitting members of the citizens’ police review commission to meet
and confer with the police union when new civil oversight mechanisms were being implemented);
Local 346, Int’l Bhd. of Police Officers v. Labor Relations Comm’n, 462 N.E.2d 96, 102 (Mass.
1984) (holding that a police department has an overriding interest in the integrity of its officers,
which exempts it from having to negotiate over the use of polygraph examinations when
investigating criminal activity by police officers); State v. State Troopers Fraternal Ass’n, 634
A.2d 478, 493 (N.J. 1993) (limiting mandatory subjects of collective bargaining for police in
disciplinary cases because of the uniqueness of police work).
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avenue through which labor unions shape the internal policies and
practices of American police departments.
B. Civil Service Protections
A parallel source of employment regulations in American police
departments is state civil service law.69 A large majority of American
states have civil service laws on the books that regulate the
appointment and discharge of public employees, including police
officers.70 Over time, the scope of civil service protections has
expanded to regulate a wide range of employment actions, including
“demotions, transfers, layoffs and recalls, discharges, training, salary
administration, attendance control, safety, grievances, pay and benefit
determination, and classification of positions.”71
The driving force behind civil service laws is a desire to establish a
merit system in public employment72—a far cry from much of
American history, when government jobs were allocated on the basis
of political patronage.73 Historians trace the origins of modern civil
service laws to the assassination of President James Garfield in 1881 by
a “disappointed office seeker,” which ultimately contributed to the
passage of the Civil Service Act, or Pendleton Act, in 1883.74 Since
then, civil service statutes have slowly spread across the United States.
By 1970, one survey estimated that some sort of civil service statute

69. It appears that a strong majority of states have civil service statutes that apply to
municipal police officers. For some representative examples of these state civil service laws, see
ALA. CODE §§ 11-43-180 to 190 (2008) (establishing a civil service system for municipal law
enforcement); ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 38-1001 to 1007 (1956) (establishing a civil service system for
law enforcement officers); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 14-51-301 to 311 (2013 & Supp. 2015)
(establishing a civil service system for firefighters and police officers); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 3130-101 to 107 (2016) (establishing a civil service system for municipal police officers); D.C. CODE
§§ 5-101.01–5.133-21, 5-1302 to 1305 (2001 & Supp. 2016) (establishing a civil service system for
police); TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE §§ 143.001–143.403 (2008 & Supp. 2016) (establishing a civil
service system for municipal police and fire department personnel). A handful of states do not
appear to have civil service protections for police officers, including Georgia, Maryland, Montana,
New Hampshire, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
70. Ann C. Hodges, The Interplay of Civil Service Law and Collective Bargaining Law in
Public Sector Employee Discipline Cases, 32 B.C. L. REV. 95, 103 (1990).
71. Id. at 102.
72. Id. (stating that a driving purpose behind civil service laws was to ensure the “selection,
promotion, and retention of government employees on the basis of merit”).
73. R. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL SERVICE LAW 1–3 (1976).
74. Id.
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protected around 80 percent of all state and local government
employees.75
As Professor Rachel Harmon has observed, civil service laws
empower frontline police officers “to challenge any internal
managerial action that affects them on both substantive and procedural
grounds in a formal adversarial process,” which ultimately leads to
“costly legal battles” when “police departments demote, transfer, or
fire any officer.”76 This arguably makes civil service laws “an especially
efficient disincentive” to police reform.77 States are split about whether
collective bargaining agreements can supersede civil service laws and
establish more protective procedures for hiring, promotion,
disciplinary action, and grievance procedures.78 Thus, in many states,
civil service laws establish a floor for police officer employment
protections, which police unions can raise through collective
bargaining.
C. Law Enforcement Officers’ Bills of Rights
In addition to collective bargaining and civil service statutes, a
handful of states have passed yet another layer of employment
protections for frontline police officers: LEOBRs.79 Unlike civil service
laws, which protect a wide range of public employees, LEOBRs
provide police officers with due process protections during disciplinary

75. Hodges, supra note 70, at 101 n.32.
76. Harmon, supra note 45, at 796.
77. Id. at 797.
78. Hodges, supra note 70, at 107–09 (describing how states have taken three different
approaches in interpreting the tension between civil service laws and collective bargaining
agreements, and walking through the possible strengths and weaknesses of each approach).
79. Craig Whitlock, Power Urged for Police Panel, WASH. POST, Apr. 7, 2000, at B1. See,
e.g., Kevin M. Keenan & Samuel Walker, An Impediment to Police Accountability? An Analysis
of Statutory Law Enforcement Officers’ Bills of Rights, 14 B. U. PUB. INT. L.J. 185, 185 (2005).
(using the term “Law Enforcement Officers’ Bills of Rights,” as have numerous major media
outlets); Paul Butler, The Police Officers’ Bill of Rights Creates a Double Standard, N.Y. TIMES
(June 27, 2015, 9:13 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/04/29/baltimoreand-bolstering-a-police-officers-right-to-remain-silent/the-police-officers-bill-of-rights-creates-adouble-standard [https://perma.cc/8H86-Z879] (using the “Law Enforcement Officers Bill of
Rights” as a term); Adam May, Maryland Police Lawyer: Officers’ Bill of Rights Is Not Wrong,
AL JAZEERA AM. (May 3, 2015, 6:00 PM), http://america.aljazeera.com/watch/shows/americatonight/articles/2015/5/3/maryland-police-lawyer-officers-bill-of-rights-is-not-wrong.html [https://
perma.cc/EA2R-34BD] (same).
For another helpful analysis of LEOBRs, which describes their proliferation and ultimately
argues that these laws could serve as a useful way to reform civilian interrogations, see generally
Kate Levine, Police Suspects, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1197 (2016).
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investigations that are not given to other classes of public employees.
LEOBRs themselves came about in part because of the Supreme
Court’s 1967 decision in Garrity v. New Jersey,80 which prevented states
from using compelled statements made by police officers during
disciplinary investigations in future criminal proceedings.81 Modern
LEOBR protections, though, go well beyond limitations on officer
interrogations.
An example from Prince George’s County, Maryland,
demonstrates the power of these LEOBRs. In 2000, the DOJ initiated
an investigation of the Prince George’s County Police Department
after an unusual pattern of fatal shootings and allegations of excessive
use of force.82 In response, community activists proposed the creation
of a civilian review board tasked with investigating citizen complaints
against law enforcement officers.83
But the activists faced a major obstacle: the state of Maryland is
one of at least sixteen states that have LEOBRs. Like other states with
LEOBRs, Maryland provides additional protections to police officers
facing internal disciplinary investigations.84 The Maryland LEOBR
specifically prevents civilians from investigating police officers,
effectively preventing meaningful community oversight of local
officers.85 The Maryland LEOBR also prevents localities from

80. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
81. Levine, supra note 79, at 1220–21; see also Garrity, 385 U.S. at 500 (holding that the
“protection . . . against coerced statements prohibits use in subsequent criminal proceedings of
statements obtained under threat of removal from office, and that it extends to all, whether they
are policemen or other members of our body politic”). See generally Steven D. Clymer, Compelled
Statements from Police Officers and Garrity Immunity, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1309 (2001) (providing
a review of the Garrity doctrine and the use of compelled testimony from police officers during
trial).
82. For more information about the circumstances that spurred federal involvement, see
Craig Whitlock & Jamie Stockwell, U.S. to Probe Pr. George’s Police Force, WASH. POST, Nov.
2, 2000, at A1. The DOJ’s investigation of the Prince George’s County Police Department
officially began on July 1, 1999. The DOJ reached a settlement with the police department on
January 22, 2004. See Rushin, Federal Enforcement, supra note 43, at 3244–47 (showing these
dates in Appendices A & B). The DOJ’s involvement in the Prince George’s County
investigations ended in early 2009. Stephen Rushin & Griffin Edwards, De-Policing, 102
CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (showing these closing dates in Appendices A & B).
83. Keenan & Walker, supra note 79, at 189 .
84. Id. at 185 (describing how LEOBRs have added a “special layer of employee due process
protections when [officers face] investigations for official misconduct”).
85. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 3-104(b) (West 2015) (stating that the investigating
officer for any investigation of a Maryland police officer should be a “sworn law enforcement
officer” unless a different party is specifically designated by the Governor, Attorney General, or
Attorney General’s designee).
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punishing officers for “brutality” unless a complaint is filed within
ninety days of the alleged incident.86 It strictly limits officer
interrogation procedures.87 And it allows police officers to remove
civilian complaints from their personnel files after three years.88 Across
the country, virtually “[n]o other group of public employees enjoys
equivalent” legislative protection during disciplinary proceedings.89
Predictably, civil rights advocates have argued that the Maryland
LEOBR “is a major obstacle to those locales that wish to establish a
system of civilian review” and other types of disciplinary procedures.90
Some states have LEOBR provisions that are even more
protective of police officers than Maryland’s. For example, Delaware
bars municipalities from requiring police officers to disclose their
personal assets.91 Such a directive is likely an attempt to protect
Delaware officers from the kind of anticorruption measures that the
DOJ required the Los Angeles Police Department to implement as
part of a federal consent decree.92 California is among several states
that bar the use of polygraphs when interrogating police officers.93
Illinois requires all citizen complaints to be accompanied by a sworn
affidavit, essentially preventing citizens from filing anonymous
complaints.94

86. Id. § 3-104(c)(2) (“Unless a complaint is filed within 90 days after the alleged brutality,
an investigation that may lead to disciplinary action under this subtitle for brutality may not be
initiated and an action may not be taken.”).
87. Id. § 3-104(d)–(k) (providing limits on the time, methods, place, and conduct of
interrogations of police officers).
88. Id. § 3-110 (providing that police officers may have their complaints in personnel files
deleted after three years and setting forth procedures for the removal of complaints that are not
sustained after an investigation).
89. Keenan & Walker, supra note 79, at 186.
90. Testimony for the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee: Senate Bill 655: Law
Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights Act 2002: Support with Amendments, 2000 Leg., 416th Sess.
2 (Md. 2002) (statement of the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of the National
Capital Area).
91. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9202 (2015) (“No officer shall be required or requested to
disclose any item of personal property, income, assets, sources of income, debts, personal or
domestic expenditures . . . .”).
92. Randal C. Archibold, Los Angeles Police Told to Disclose Their Finances, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 21, 2007, at A28 (explaining how, as part of a federal consent decree under 42 U.S.C. § 14141,
the LAPD had to require “an array of personal financial” disclosures to fight corruption in the
department’s gang and narcotics divisions; this measure faced fierce opposition from police union
leaders who argued that it would lead to a “mass exodus from the units”).
93. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 3307(a) (West 2015) (“No public safety officer shall be compelled
to submit to a lie detector test against his or her will.”).
94. 85 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 725/3.8(b) (West 2011).
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Police officers have secured such extensive protections by arguing
that special disciplinary procedures are necessary, as police “must be
granted the widest latitude to exercise their discretion in handling
difficult and often dangerous situations, and should not be secondguessed if a decision appears in retrospect to have been incorrect.”95
Critics have argued that LEOBRs represent an attempt by police
officers to take advantage of their “knowledge of how the criminal
justice system works . . . [to] shield themselves from its operation[].”96
But Professor Kate Levine has suggested that the interrogation
limitations included in some LEOBRs are “more in line with our
current notions of humane treatment of those who are suspected of
violating the criminal law.”97 Thus, she imagines how policymakers
could use these highly protective LEOBRs as a starting point for
“reinvigorat[ing] the debate over how to protect criminal suspects”
during interrogations.98
The approximately sixteen states that have passed generally
applicable LEOBRs employ roughly 37.4 percent of all municipal
police officers in the United States.99 That number may rise in the near
future. Eleven other states have recently considered passing their own
LEOBRs.100 And Congress has periodically considered the passage of
a national LEOBR, although such proposals have yet to gain
significant traction.101 Appendix C breaks down some of the most

95. Keenan & Walker, supra note 79, at 186.
96. Levine, supra note 79, at 1211–12.
97. Id. at 1212.
98. Id.
99. The sixteen states that have generally applicable LEOBRs are Arizona, California,
Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Nevada, New
Mexico, Rhode Island, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Eli Hager, Blue Shield: Did You
Know Police Have Their Own Bill of Rights?, MARSHALL PROJECT (Apr. 27, 2015,
12:06 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/04/27/blue-shield [https://perma.cc/KH8FMEP7] (identifying all of these statutes, except Iowa’s); see IOWA CODE § 80F.1 (2007)
(establishing Iowa’s so-called “Peace Officer, Public Safety, and Emergency Personnel Bill of
Rights”). These sixteen states have approximately 238,028 of the nation’s 635,781 law
enforcement officers, or around 37.4 percent. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN
THE UNITED STATES: FULL-TIME LAW ENFORCEMENT EMPLOYEES, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-inthe-u.s/2015/crime-in-the-u.s.-2015/tables/table-77 [https://perma.cc/5RDS-W4NZ] (showing the
number of police officers employed in each state). Texas has passed a LEOBR that only applies
to cities with a population of over 1.5 million citizens. See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 143.123
(West 1987). This means that this state law only applies to one city—Houston. Other states have
more generally applicable state LEOBRs.
100. Hager, supra note 99.
101. Id.
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highly protective and potentially problematic provisions in state
LEOBRs.
D. Other Police Protections
In addition to collective bargaining statutes, civil service statutes,
and LEOBRs, a number of states have passed or recently considered
additional employment protections designed to shield police officers
from harassment or privacy violations. Events in Philadelphia
demonstrate the growing demand for additional labor and employment
protections for frontline police officers. When then-Philadelphia Police
Commissioner Charles Ramsey attempted to pass an internal
regulation that would have provided for the release of the names of
officers involved in civilian shootings, the Fraternal Order of Police
filed an unfair labor practices charge, alleging that Chief Ramsey had
not properly negotiated with the union over this policy change.102 The
union then lobbied the Pennsylvania legislature for a bill that would
protect the identities of police involved in civilian shootings.103
Pennsylvania is one of several states that have considered such
bills over the last several years.104 For example, a substantial number of
states have enacted legislative limitations on open records laws to
prevent the public from accessing officers’ personnel and disciplinary
files.105 And a number of states and localities have acted to prevent the

102. John Sullivan et al., In Fatal Shootings by Police, 1 in 5 Officers’ Names Go Undisclosed,
WASH. POST (Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/in-fatal-shootingsby-police-1-in-5-officers-names-go-undisclosed/2016/03/31/4bb08bc8-ea10-11e5-b0fd-073d5930a
7b7_story.html [https://perma.cc/7L2T-CUPL].
103. Id.
104. Id. (stating that “[i]n Oregon, lawmakers in the state House in February passed a bill that
would have allowed police departments to withhold for 90 days the names of officers who have
received threats,” and in Phoenix, “police unions objected when the department there released
the name of the officer who fatally shot” a civilian).
105. See Robert Lewis, Noah Veltman & Xander Landen, Is Police Misconduct a Secret in
Your State?, WNYC NEWS (Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.wnyc.org/story/police-misconduct-records
[https://perma.cc/UBM8-KNC6] (“In these states, police disciplinary records are generally
available to the public. Many of these states still make records of unsubstantiated complaints or
active investigations confidential.”); see also Jim Miller, California Has Tightest Restrictions on
Law Enforcement Records, Access Advocates Say, MODESTO BEE (Mar. 17, 2014, 12:00 AM),
http://www.modbee.com/news/state/article3162015.html [https://perma.cc/Y68F-5LV5] (“[O]pen
records advocates say California residents today have some of the least access to law enforcement
records of anywhere in the country.”). It is also worth noting that when the California measure
was passed in 1978, Governor Jerry Brown hailed it as a “substantial step forward in protecting
the rights of law enforcement officers,” and it received strong support. Id.
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public from accessing police body-camera footage without a court
order.106
II. EXISTING RESEARCH
Police union contracts, civil service laws, and LEOBRs provide
police officers with an array of legal protections in cases of internal
disciplinary investigations. While each of these mechanisms could
theoretically insulate officers from accountability and oversight, this
Article focuses specifically on the content of disciplinary procedures in
police union contracts. More specifically, it evaluates how modern
police union contracts limit disciplinary investigation and oversight of
frontline police officers. The existing literature contains little
discussion of the disciplinary procedures that police unions have
obtained through collective bargaining. This is in part because there
are thousands of decentralized police departments in the United
States, and each negotiates its own collective bargaining agreements,
largely outside public view.107
Only a few legal scholars have discussed the relationship between
police union contracts and internal disciplinary action. Professor Seth
Stoughton hypothesizes that grievance procedures found in collective
bargaining agreements may “both discourage and frustrate attempts to
discipline officers.”108 Harmon observes that collective bargaining
106. See, e.g., Emanuella Grinberg, North Carolina Law Blocks Release of Police Recordings,
CNN (July 13, 2016, 11:08 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/12/politics/north-carolina-policerecording-law/index.html [https://perma.cc/W4XZ-Y5TU] (“North Carolina . . . [passed]
legislation this week that blocks the release of law enforcement recordings from body cameras or
dashboard cameras with limited exceptions.”); Peter Hermann & Aaron C. Davis, As Police
Body Cameras Catch On, a Debate Surfaces: Who Gets to Watch?, WASH. POST
(Apr. 17, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/as-police-body-cameras-catch-ona-debate-surfaces-who-gets-to-watch/2015/04/17/c4ef64f8-e360-11e4-81ea-0649268f729e_story.
html [https://perma.cc/5MNR-X3RY] (explaining that “[o]fficials in more than a dozen states—
as well as the District [of Columbia]—have proposed restricting access or completely withholding
the footage from the public, citing concerns over privacy and the time and cost of blurring images
that identify victims, witnesses or bystanders caught in front of the lens”).
107. BRIAN A. REAVES, CENSUS OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES,
2008, at 2 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, Bulletin No. 233982, 2011), http://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/csllea08.pdf [https://perma.cc/J7YL-LQA2] (putting the number of state and local law
enforcement agencies at 17,985).
108. Stoughton, supra note 45, at 2211. Professor Seth Stoughton also theorizes that collective
bargaining might create or aggravate “intradepartmental tensions.” Id. at 2214. One other
fascinating consequence of collective bargaining in police departments, as hypothesized by
Stoughton, is the increasingly long and complex “petty military and bureaucratic regulations” that
codify acceptable and unacceptable behavior in “shockingly great and verbose detail.” Id. at 2213.
For example, Stoughton cites the more than 1600 pages of manuals which New York City police

RUSHIN IN PRINTER FINAL V.2 (DO NOT DELETE)

1214

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

1/28/2018 11:13 PM

[Vol. 66:1191

rights might “deter department-wide changes intended to prevent
constitutional violations.”109 Professor Samuel Walker wrote on the
relationship between collective bargaining and disciplinary
procedures, pointing out that provisions in police union contracts like
Baltimore’s prevent supervisors from responding forcefully to officer
wrongdoing.110 Professors Catherine Fisk and L. Song Richardson have
written an important and detailed account of how unions can both
impede and promote reform in police departments.111 Fisk and
Richardson ultimately argue that states should permit a limited form
of minority union bargaining—that is, bargaining by a minority of the
employees in a bargaining unit—in hopes of empowering officer
groups supportive of reform in their efforts to influence policing
practices.112
Combined, the existing legal literature provides some evidence for
the hypothesis that collective bargaining can impede police
accountability efforts. But this literature is largely theoretical rather
than empirical.113 Two existing studies outside of legal academia have
shed some light on the content of police union contracts. First,
Professors David Carter and Allen Sapp completed one of the only
other empirical studies on the content of police union contracts in
1992.114 In their analysis, though, Carter and Sapp did not focus
specifically on language within these contracts dealing with disciplinary
procedures. Instead, they provided a descriptive analysis of the
common topics of negotiation in union contracts. Additionally,

must master. Even smaller cities like Madison have policy manuals around four hundred pages in
length. Id.
109. Harmon, supra note 45, at 799.
110. WALKER, supra note 22, at 2.
111. See generally Fisk & Richardson, supra note 47 (providing in a forthcoming paper a
historical account of how unions may both impede and facilitate reform in police departments).
112. Id. (manuscript at 65) (“We would allow officers to belong both to the minority union
and to the majority union so that they would not have to give up the benefits of majority union
membership . . . but also could gain the benefits of membership in the minority union
[like] . . . (the ability to have a voice in the minority union’s governance and priority-setting
policies).”).
113. One previous empirical study has examined how labor protections in the CPD’s union
contract in the early 1990s may have resulted in a reduction in disciplinary action against police
officers. Mark Iris, Police Discipline in Chicago: Arbitration or Arbitrary?, 89 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 215, 216 (1998) (citing how mandatory arbitration resulted in disciplinary action
essentially being cut in half for many officers in Chicago).
114. David L. Carter & Allen D. Sapp, A Comparative Analysis of Clauses in Police Collective
Bargaining Agreements as Indicators of Change in Labor Relations, 12 AM. J. POLICE 17, 17
(1992).
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because they completed their study over two decades ago, Carter and
Sapp’s work may no longer reflect the state of police union contracts
today.115
Second, community activists, in part associated with groups like
Black Lives Matter, have organized grassroots efforts to collect and
consider the merits of police union contracts from around eighty large
cities.116 While this work has shed some important light on potentially
troubling patterns in police union contracts, it by no means forecloses
the need for additional research.
As discussed more in Part IV, this Article improves on the
methodology used in these previous studies of police union contracts
in several ways. It relies on a substantially larger collection of police
union contracts than the recent work done by community activists. It
also considers different categories of disciplinary procedures when
analyzing police union contracts. In addition, it explicitly evaluates the
legal issues surrounding police unionization and offers normative
recommendations. In sum, the existing literature—particularly the
existing literature within legal academia—lacks a comprehensive study
of the content of police union contracts.
This gap in the literature is increasingly problematic for two
reasons. First, at least theoretically, the conditions under which most
municipalities negotiate police union contracts are susceptible to
regulatory capture.117 Negotiations typically happen outside of the
public view.118 Police unions are also a powerful political

115. Id. at 17–18 (explaining that their article was intended to provide a descriptive analysis
of the common topics of negotiation in union contracts, as specifically requested by those in the
field).
116. The website Check the Police, which is associated with the Black Lives Matter movement,
has been collecting police union contracts contemporaneously with the writing of this article.
CHECK THE POLICE, http://www.checkthepolice.org [https://perma.cc/SQX2-6BGS].
117. Regulatory capture describes a form of government failure in which a regulatory entity
responsible for protecting the public interest instead advances the interests of the entity it was
tasked with regulating. For further explanation, see generally Ernesto Dal Bó, Regulatory
Capture: A Review, 22 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 203 (2006). For a recent example of alleged
regulatory capture, see Regulatory Capture 101: Impressionable Journalists Finally Meet George
Stigler, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 6, 2014, 1:49 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/regulatory-capture101-1412544509 [https://perma.cc/ZU35-3XC6] (describing the regulatory capture that occurred
when the Federal Reserve Bank of New York relaxed its oversight of Goldman Sachs).
118. Only eight states require public hearings for police union negotiations and only four
states require that municipalities make these agreements public before ratification. See
ABRAHAM, supra note 39, at 5–8 (providing links to various state statutes).
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constituency.119 For this reason, municipal leaders may be strongly
incentivized to offer concessions to police unions on disciplinary
procedures in exchange for lower officer salaries.120 Because municipal
expenditures can dominate local headlines, the result is a sort of moral
hazard.121 Municipal leaders may be incentivized to offer concessions
on police disciplinary procedures because they are less likely to bear
the costs of those concessions in the immediate future. After all, the
typical victim of police misconduct is often a member of a relatively
small and politically disadvantaged minority of municipal voters.122
Thus, it seems theoretically plausible that police unions may be able to
obtain unreasonably favorable disciplinary procedures through
collective bargaining—perhaps beyond those that exist in civil service
statutes or LEOBRs.
Second, this gap in the literature is problematic in an age in which
police accountability has dominated headlines. In a handful of
individual cases, the media and community groups have uncovered
provisions in police union contracts that appear to limit officer

119. Delgado, supra note 60 (arguing that conservatives have helped police unions become
too politically powerful); Stoughton, supra note 45, at 2207 (describing the wide political and
social support for police unions).
For some examples of the modern power of police unions in shaping political decisions
and the national dialogue, see Lee Fang, Maryland Cop Lobbyists Helped Block Reforms Just
Last Month, INTERCEPT (Apr. 28, 2015, 9:42 AM), https://theintercept.com/2015/04/28/
balltimore-freddie-gray-prosecute [https://perma.cc/L2YV-222A] (describing police unions as a
“major force in state politics” in Maryland, which have been able to block legislation they view as
unfavorable to police officers); David Firestone, The Rise of New York’s Police Unions,
GUARDIAN (Jan. 13, 2015, 8:46 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jan/13/newyork-police-unions-powerful [https://perma.cc/FP5N-YE5P] (describing how New York’s police
unions have “flexed their muscles to help their members” and even “orchestrat[ed] a politically
motivated slowdown in arrests and ticket-writing” to protest new regulation); Conor Friedersdorf,
How Police Unions and Arbitrators Keep Abusive Cops on the Streets, ATLANTIC (Dec. 2, 2014),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/12/how-police-unions-keep-abusive-cops-onthe-street/383258 [https://perma.cc/XZ5N-E96N] (walking through how police unions have
developed enough power that they can effectively prevent discipline against officers); Michael
Tracey, The Pernicious Power of the Police Lobby, VICE (Dec. 4, 2014, 9:42 AM), http://www.vice.
com/read/the-pernicious-power-of-police-unions [https://perma.cc/A6SM-DYNL] (describing
how powerful police unions have blocked meaningful reforms of police behavior).
120. See infra notes 273–77 and accompanying text.
121. See Maria O’Brien Hylton, Combating Moral Hazard: The Case for Rationalizing Public
Employee Benefits, 45 IND. L. REV. 413, 416 (2012) (“In general, moral hazard problems arise in
the context of information asymmetry: one party (politicians) has more information and less
concern about the consequences of their behavior than the party that must pay (taxpayers).”).
122. Stephen Rushin, Using Data to Reduce Police Violence, 57 B.C. L. REV. 117, 145–50
(2016) [hereinafter Rushin, Using Data] (describing how those victimized by police misconduct
are often marginalized and have little political power to fight back).
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accountability.123 A hack of the Fraternal Order of Police’s server has
revealed dozens of additional contracts—many of which appeared to
contain unusually deferential disciplinary standards for officers.124 All
of this suggests that the relationship between union contracts and
police accountability is an issue of serious national concern warranting
additional empirical examination.
III. METHODOLOGY
While the existing literature has shown the presence of
problematic provisions in a handful of police union contracts, there is
a need for a contemporary, empirical examination of the frequency of
such provisions. To begin filling this gap in the existing literature, I
collected and coded police union contracts from American cities with
a population of over one hundred thousand residents.125 Public record

123. See, e.g., David C. Couper, To Address Shootings, Start by Diminishing the Power
of the Unions, USA TODAY (July 7, 2016, 8:31 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/
opinion/policing/spotlight/2016/07/07/address-shootings-start-diminishing-power-unions-column/
84944524 [https://perma.cc/KZ52-2W4C] (linking the lack of accountability in police departments
to the power of police unions and collective bargaining); Ross Douthat, Our Police Union
Problem, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/03/opinion/sunday/rossdouthat-our-police-union-problem.html [https://perma.cc/LKN8-TPZQ] (connecting the lack of
accountability in police departments to unionization); Adeshina Emmanuel, State Law Protects
Police Contract Provisions Blasted by Task Force, CHI. MAG. (Apr. 26, 2016), http://www.
chicagomag.com/city-life/April-2016/State-Law-Protects-Police-Contract-Provisions-Blasted-byTask-Force [https://perma.cc/3TCN-QQ68] (discussing the link between union contracts and
accountability).
124. See George Joseph, Leaked Police Files Contain Guarantees Disciplinary Records Will
Be Kept Secret, GUARDIAN (Feb. 7, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2016/feb/07/leaked-police-files-contain-guarantees-disciplinary-records-will-be-kept-secret
[https://perma.cc/K5A9-BUKN] (describing the hack of the Fraternal Order of Police database
and a follow-up study conducted by reporters at the Guardian who found that a substantial
number of the sixty-seven contracts studied had some limitations on disciplinary action against
officers accused of misconduct).
125. This study uses the 2010 U.S. Census to identify 252 cities with a population of at least
one hundred thousand. This study added a handful of additional cities that appeared to have
surpassed one hundred thousand residents in the years since the census. Annual Estimates of
Resident Population for Incorporated Places of 50,000 or More in 2014, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU
(May 2016), http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=
PEP_2015_PEPANNCHIP>US12A&prodType=table [https://perma.cc/KT2W-5VFN]. Of these
252 cities with over one hundred thousand residents, 223 are located in states favorable to police
unionization. A substantial number of these 223 cities are located in states that permit, but do not
require unionization of frontline police officers, like Texas. Thus, the actual number of cities with
over one hundred thousand residents that actually collectively bargain with their police force
appears to be lower than 223—likely closer to two hundred.
It is not uncommon for municipalities to negotiate separately with different labor unions
that represent different segments of a police department. For example, Boston, Buffalo,
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requests, examinations of municipal government websites, and online
searches resulted in the collection of police union contracts from 178
municipalities between 2014 and 2016.126 Appendix A provides a full
list of all the municipalities included in this dataset.
The contracts in this dataset govern the working conditions in
police departments that employ around 170,625 municipal police
officers.127 While police departments commonly negotiate collective
bargaining agreements with a number of different unions,128 this
Article focuses specifically on those agreements governing the working
conditions of frontline police officers—a category distinct from
contracts that govern police supervisors like sergeants, lieutenants, or
captains. Approximately 411,682 officers work in states with laws that
permit or require collective bargaining in police departments.129 Thus,

Cincinnati, Cleveland, and New York are just a handful of cities in this sample that negotiate
contracts with multiple police unions.
126. In a small number of cases, when I could not obtain the union contract directly from the
municipality, I relied on the most recently available union contract I could find through the
municipal or other state website. Even when I received the union contract directly from the
municipality, some of these contracts may have lapsed between the time of collection and the time
of publication. That is, the municipality and the local police union may have since agreed to a new
contract, which has since replaced the contract analyzed in this Article. This is an unavoidable
consequence of collecting so many contracts and the long publication process. Nevertheless, this
potential limitation should have little effect on the overall analysis in this Article. For those
contracts that recently lapsed, there is little reason to think that police union contracts have
changed significantly in the last few years. The ultimate goal of this Article is not to examine the
contents of any one particular union contract, but to instead provide some statistical sense about
the frequency of problematic disciplinary provisions across the entire universe of police union
contracts in large American cities. Before making any conclusions about the contents of a specific
city’s police union contract, I strongly advise readers to check for the most up-to-date version of
their targeted contract.
127. The total number of officers serving in each department included in this dataset can be
found in Appendix A.
128. Stoughton, supra note 45, at 2207 (“Large law enforcement agencies typically bargain
with multiple unions.”).
129. I obtained this number by first estimating the number of municipal police officers in
states that permit or require police unionization. There are an estimated 461,063 municipal police
officers in the United States. This figure does not include officers that work at the federal level,
state level, or for sheriff’s departments. It only includes officers who work for municipal police
departments in incorporated cities. The states that are not favorable to police unionization
employ 49,381 municipal police officers. Thus, the entire population of police officers in states
that permit or require police unionization is 411,682.
It is important to recognize that the actual number of officers whose working conditions
are governed by a union contract is likely substantially lower than 411,682, as many cities in states
that permit unionization have chosen not to negotiate with police unions. However, using this
conservative estimate, this study can safely claim to examine the union contracts that govern the
working conditions of 170,625 municipal officers, or 41.4 percent of the population of municipal
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the dataset in this study covers approximately 41.4 percent of municipal
police officers in states that permit or require collective bargaining.
While this dataset helps readers understand the content of police union
contracts in many large American cities, it is not necessarily
generalizable to all police departments, particularly those in smaller
municipalities.130 This analysis is also focused specifically on
disciplinary procedures. More research may be helpful in identifying
other important trends in these contracts.
Before coding my dataset to identify the frequency of problematic
disciplinary provisions, I first developed a coding scheme. To do this, I
conducted a preliminary examination of the dataset, surveyed the
existing literature, and consulted media reports. Through this iterative
process, I settled on a coding scheme that included seven recurring and
potentially problematic disciplinary provisions. Figure 1 defines these
seven common categories of problematic police union provisions.

officers working in states that permit or require unionization. See REAVES, supra note 59, at 2,
16.
130. A few words of caution about the generalizability of this study are in order. The sample
used in this study is not necessarily representative of the entire population of unionized police
departments in the United States. The sampling methodology used in this study focused
specifically on the nation’s largest police departments. Since these agencies serve a larger crosssection of the American population, this methodology allows this Article to get the biggest
proverbial “bang for the buck.” But readers should be cautious when speaking about the
generalizability of these findings. No doubt, this sample provides a detailed look at the content of
police union contracts in large American cities. It remains unclear, however, whether union
contracts in large municipalities differ in any systematic way from union contracts in smaller
communities.
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Figure 1: Coding Scheme
Problematic Provision

Definition

Delays Interrogations of
Officers Suspected of
Misconduct

The contract includes any stipulation that delays officer
interviews or interrogations after alleged wrongdoing for
a set length of time (for example, two days or twenty-four
hours).

Provides Access to
Evidence Before
Interview

The contract provides officers with access to evidence
before interviews or interrogations about alleged
wrongdoing (for example, complete investigative files or
statements from other witnesses).

Limits Consideration of
Disciplinary History

The contract mandates the destruction or purging of
disciplinary records from personnel files after a set length
of time, or limits the consideration of disciplinary records
in future employment actions.

Limits Length of
Investigation or
Establishes Statute of
Limitations

The contract prohibits the interrogation, investigation, or
punishment of officers on the basis of alleged wrongdoing
if too much time has elapsed since its alleged occurrence,
or since the initiation of the investigation.

Limits Anonymous
Complaints

The contract prohibits supervisors from interrogating,
investigating, or disciplining officers on the basis of
anonymous civilian complaints.

Limits Civilian Oversight

The contract prohibits civilian groups from acquiring the
authority to investigate, discipline, or terminate officers
for alleged wrongdoing.

Permits or Requires
Arbitration

The contract permits or requires arbitration of disputes
related to disciplinary penalties or termination.

Using the definitions in Figure 1, I then coded the sample of 178
police union contracts to determine the frequency of each of these
categories of potentially problematic disciplinary provisions—that is,
to determine whether each contract contained language consistent with
the definition listed in Figure 1. To ensure reliability, I analyzed each
contract two separate times. To ensure replicability, I have made all of
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the union contracts examined in this study publicly available.131 The full
results of this analysis can be found in Appendix B.
Admittedly, this analysis does not capture all potentially
problematic provisions in police union contracts. In examining each
union contract, I also identified a number of somewhat less frequent
but nonetheless troubling provisions that may directly or indirectly
impede officer accountability. For instance, one contract requires the
police chief to solicit union approval before enacting any policy
changes not explicitly identified in the contract.132 At least one contract
bars internal investigators from using lineups during internal
investigations.133 A few contracts bar internal investigators from
searching officers’ lockers.134 And a significant number of contracts
require the municipality to indemnify officers in cases of civil
judgments.135
Police-reform advocates may argue that any of these provisions
constitutes a significant limitation on officer accountability. However,
these sorts of provisions seemed less prevalent than the categories
identified in Figure 1. The next Part discusses the content of police
union contracts and demonstrates how these problematic provisions
limit officer accountability.

131. All of these collective bargaining agreements are available to the public for download
with a Dropbox account at the following link, temporarily housed at https://goo.gl/Jy8aQg
[https://perma.cc/8CC2-ZJW5]. They are also on file with the Duke Law Journal.
132. SALT LAKE CITY CORP., MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN SALT LAKE
CITY CORPORATION AND THE SALT LAKE POLICE ASSOCIATION 9 (2014) (on file with the Duke
Law Journal).
133. CITY OF EVANSVILLE, A RESOLUTION OF THE COMMON COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF
EVANSVILLE RATIFYING, CONFIRMING, AUTHORIZING AND APPROVING AN AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE CITY OF EVANSVILLE AND THE FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE EVANSVILLE
NO. 73 INC. 25 (2016) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (“A member shall not be compelled to
appear in a formal police line-up in any administrative investigation . . . .”).
134. See, e.g., id. at 24; CITY OF TOPEKA, AGREEMENT BETWEEN CITY OF TOPEKA AND
FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE LODGE NO. 3, at 75 (2016) (on file with the Duke Law Journal)
(“Topeka Police Officers shall not have their lockers or other space for storage that is assigned to
the officer searched, except with the officer’s permission and in his/her presence.”).
135. See, e.g., CITY OF ANN ARBOR, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
CITY OF ANN ARBOR AND ANN ARBOR POLICE OFFICERS’ ASSOCIATION FOR POLICE SERVICE
SPECIALISTS 51 (2013) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (“[T]he Employer will indemnify and
defend employees in connection with liability claims arising out of the performance of the
employee’s police duties.”); CITY OF DAVENPORT, AGREEMENT BETWEEN CITY OF
DAVENPORT, IOWA AND UNION OF PROFESSIONAL POLICE, INC. 28 (July 1, 2013) (“[T]he city
shall fully indemnify and hold harmless the employees of the Union with respect to any liability
arising out of the performance of their duties.”).
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IV. HOW MANY POLICE UNION CONTRACTS
LIMIT ACCOUNTABILITY
I find that police union contracts commonly contain provisions
that can insulate frontline officers from accountability and oversight.
A large number of police union contracts delay officer interrogations
after alleged misconduct and require investigators to provide officers
with access to evidence before beginning interrogations.136 Many call
for the destruction of officer personnel records after a set period of
time.137 Multiple contracts attempt to ban or limit the scope of civilian
oversight.138 And many bar management from investigating
anonymous complaints, limit the statute of limitations, or limit the
length of investigations.139 Figure 2 offers a detailed breakdown of the
prevalence of these common provisions in the twenty-five largest cities
that permit collective bargaining.

Austin
Boston
Chicago
Columbus
Dallas
Denver

136.
137.
138.
139.

See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.C.
See infra Part IV.D.
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Figure 2: Problematic Provisions in Contracts Governing Police
Unions in the Largest Cities
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Detroit
El Paso
Fort Worth
Houston
Indianapolis
Jacksonville
Las Vegas
Los Angeles
Memphis
New York
Philadelphia
Phoenix
Portland
San Antonio
San Diego
San Francisco
San Jose
Seattle
Washington, D.C.
Note: The darkened boxes indicate the presence of a problematic provision identified in
the coding scheme.
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A full breakdown of the collective bargaining agreements from all
178 cities can be found in Appendix B.140 Overall, 156 of the 178 police
union contracts examined in this study—around 88 percent—
contained at least one provision that could thwart legitimate
disciplinary actions against officers engaged in misconduct. The
sections that follow discuss some of the most common ways that police
union contracts limit investigations of officer misconduct.
A. Officer Interrogations
Imagine if, before interrogating a suspect, police officers had to
provide the suspect with written statements from all other witnesses
with knowledge of the crime. Imagine if, prior to conducting
interrogations, police officers were required to provide suspects and
their attorneys with a full and truthful accounting of all the evidence
against them. And imagine if police were required to provide all
suspects and their attorneys with advance notice—anywhere from
twenty-four hours to ten days in length—before conducting
interrogations. Most experienced police officers would balk at such
hindrances on their ability to interrogate criminal suspects. They might
understandably tell you that such limitations would make it
unreasonably difficult to elicit incriminating statements from suspects.
These are just a handful of the procedural requirements that some
union contracts promise to police officers during internal
investigations.141 Many of the collective bargaining agreements in this
study place some significant limitation on the interrogations of police
officers—particularly those in states that do not already provide
comparable protections through LEOBRs. A few of these limitations
are uncontroversial. For instance, many collective bargaining
agreements allow officers to obtain advice from legal counsel.142 Some
140. In addition to the problematic provisions identified in Figure 2, some collective
bargaining agreements also include language that indemnifies police officers found liable in the
event of civil judgments, mandates paid time off for police officers who kill civilians in the line of
duty, and places additional limitations on the interrogation of police officers.
141. The discovery of just a few of these procedural protections in individual departments has
led some in the press to observe that officers are treated significantly better than private citizens
during interrogations. See, e.g., Mark Joseph Stern, The Special Treatment Louisiana Gives to
Police Officers Suspected of a Crime, SLATE (July 6, 2016, 2:20 PM), http://www.slate.com/
blogs/the_slatest/2016/07/06/alton_sterling_police_officers_won_t_have_police_bill_of_rights_to
_protect.html [https://perma.cc/95H3-ELES] (examining the treatment of Louisiana police
officers after allegations of criminal conduct in the wake of the Alton Sterling shooting).
142. See, e.g., CITY OF LOUISVILLE, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BY AND
BETWEEN LOUISVILLE/JEFFERSON COUNTY METRO GOVERNMENT AND RIVER CITY
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contracts also provide officers with basic protections against abuse
during interrogations. Professor Kate Levine has persuasively argued
that it is advantageous to provide basic interrogation protections that
insulate frontline officers from undergoing lengthy interrogations,
discourage inducements through threats or promises of leniency, and
guarantee basic necessities like regular meals, sleep, and bathroom
use.143 This Article makes no objection to such reasonable
accommodations during interrogations.
Some other limitations on the interrogation of frontline officers,
though, appear designed to insulate them from accountability rather
than to protect their basic rights. For instance, a number of cities,
including Albuquerque,144 Anchorage,145 Austin,146 Chandler,147

FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE LODGE #614, POLICE OFFICER AND SERGEANTS 18–19 (2013)
(on file with the Duke Law Journal) (providing the right to counsel for officers facing questions
after using deadly force); CITY OF ORLANDO, AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY OF ORLANDO
AND ORLANDO LODGE #25, FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, INC. 3–4 (2013) (on file with the
Duke Law Journal) (giving officers implicated in a disciplinary investigation the right to have a
union representative and/or counsel present during interactions with internal-affairs
investigators).
143. Levine, supra note 79, at 1241–46.
144. CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN CITY OF
ALBUQUERQUE AND ALBUQUERQUE POLICE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION 31 (2014) (on file with
the Duke Law Journal) (permitting officers to have two hours to consult with counsel before
providing statements).
145. MUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN
ANCHORAGE POLICE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION AND MUNICIPALITY OF
ANCHORAGE 8 (2015) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (guaranteeing officers at least twentyfour hours’ notice before any noncriminal misconduct interview).
146. CITY OF AUSTIN, AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY OF AUSTIN AND THE AUSTIN
POLICE ASSOCIATION 50 (2013) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (guaranteeing officers at
least forty-eight hours’ notice before providing a statement regarding a disciplinary investigation,
and requiring that officers receive a copy of the complaint, including the names of the person(s)
making the complaint).
147. CITY OF CHANDLER, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN CITY OF
CHANDLER AND CHANDLER LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSOCIATION 11 (2013) (on file with the
Duke Law Journal) (designating a forty-eight-hour waiting period for interviews of officers after
officer-involved shootings, but providing an exception that would allow the chief to dismiss this
waiting period under certain circumstances).
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Chicago,148 Columbus,149 Corpus Christi,150 El Paso,151 Fort Worth,152
Houston,153 Kansas City,154 Louisville,155 Miami,156 Minneapolis,157 San

148. CITY OF CHI., AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY OF CHICAGO DEPARTMENT OF POLICE
7, at 6 (2012) (on file with the
Duke Law Journal) (providing that an interview be “postponed for a reasonable time,” but for
no more than forty-eight hours from the time the officer is informed of a request for an interview).
149. CITY OF COLUMBUS, AGREEMENT BETWEEN CITY OF COLUMBUS AND FRATERNAL
ORDER OF POLICE, CAPITAL CITY LODGE NO. 9, at 14 (2014) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal) (guaranteeing officers at least twenty-four hours’ notice before disciplinary interviews,
unless otherwise necessary).
150. CITY OF CORPUS CHRISTI, AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY OF CORPUS CHRISTI AND
THE CORPUS CHRISTI POLICE OFFICERS’ ASSOCIATION 16 (2015) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal) (guaranteeing officers at least forty-eight hours’ notice before disciplinary interviews,
absent exigent circumstances).
151. CITY OF EL PASO, ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN CITY OF EL PASO, TEXAS AND
EL PASO MUNICIPAL POLICE OFFICERS’ ASSOCIATION 55 (2014) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal) (establishing a forty-eight hour waiting period, except in exigent circumstances, before
any disciplinary interviews of officers regarding critical incidents, officer-involved shootings, and
deaths in custody).
152. CITY OF FORT WORTH, MEET AND CONFER LABOR AGREEMENT BETWEEN CITY OF
FORT WORTH, TEXAS AND FORT WORTH POLICE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION 15 (2013) (on file
with the Duke Law Journal) (establishing a forty-eight-hour waiting period before any
disciplinary interviews of officers, except in exigent circumstances, and guaranteeing that officers
receive a signed explanation of the basis for an interview).
153. CITY OF HOUSTON, MEET & CONFER AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE HOUSTON POLICE
OFFICERS’ UNION AND THE CITY OF HOUSTON, TEXAS 39–40 (2015) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal) (establishing a forty-eight-hour waiting period before any disciplinary interviews of
officers).
154. CITY OF KAN. CITY, MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE BOARD OF
POLICE COMMISSIONERS OF KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI AND FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE
LODGE NO. 99, at 9 (2014) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (providing officers with twentyfour hours to secure counsel and forty-eight hours to provide statements).
155. CITY OF LOUISVILLE, supra note 142, at 16 (requiring that investigators provide officers
with written notice of upcoming interrogations at least forty-eight hours in advance).
156. CITY OF MIAMI, AGREEMENT BETWEEN CITY OF MIAMI, MIAMI, FLORIDA AND
FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, WALTER E. HEADLEY, JR., MIAMI LODGE NO. 20, at 15–16
(2012) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (choosing not to designate a specific period of time
for the delay of officer interviews, but stipulating that before any officer interview happens, all
identifiable witnesses must be interviewed, if possible, and the officer must be given “all witness
statements, including all other existing subject officer statements, and all other existing evidence,
including, but not limited to, incident reports, GPS locator information, and audio or video
recordings relating to the incident under investigation”).
157. CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS, LABOR AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS
AND THE POLICE OFFICERS’ FEDERATION OF MINNEAPOLIS 4 (2012) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal) (establishing a forty-eight-hour waiting period before any disciplinary interviews).
AND THE FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE CHICAGO LODGE NO.
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Antonio,158 San Diego,159 Seattle,160 and Washington, D.C.,161 delay
officer interrogations anywhere from a few hours to several days after
suspected misconduct—and, in many cities, even after officer-involved
shootings. In total, fifty of the municipalities in this study delay
interrogations by some substantial period of time.162 A smaller, but still
significant, number of municipalities (thirty-four) mandate that
supervisors provide frontline officers with copies of all evidence of
wrongdoing against them hours or even days in advance of
interrogations.163
Union leaders may argue that by delaying interrogations and
providing officers with access to the evidence against them, these
contracts prevent investigators from taking advantage of officers.
While concerns about coercion are understandable, these policies are
contrary to recognized best practices in law enforcement.164 Federal
consent decrees, including those in Los Angeles,165 Seattle,166 New
158. CITY OF SAN ANTONIO, AGREEMENT BY AND BETWEEN THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO,
TEXAS AND THE SAN ANTONIO POLICE OFFICERS’ ASSOCIATION 81 (2009) (on file with the
Duke Law Journal) (providing a forty-eight-hour waiting period before any disciplinary
interviews of officers).
159. CITY OF SAN DIEGO, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BY AND BETWEEN CITY OF
SAN DIEGO AND SAN DIEGO POLICE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION 49 (2015) (on file with the Duke
Law Journal) (establishing a three-working-day delay before investigators can conduct an
interview with an officer under suspicion for a disciplinary violation, unless the delay will hamper
the gathering of evidence).
160. CITY OF SEATTLE, AGREEMENT BY AND BETWEEN THE CITY OF SEATTLE AND
SEATTLE POLICE OFFICERS’ GUILD 11–12 (2013) (on file with the Duke Law Journal)
(guaranteeing officers anywhere from five to thirty days of notice before disciplinary interviews,
except in exigent circumstances).
161. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, LABOR AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT AND THE FRATERNAL ORDER
OF POLICE MPD LABOR COMMITTEE 14 (2005) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (providing
a waiting period of up to two hours before investigators can interview an officer).
162. See infra Appendix C (first column entitled “Delays Interview”).
163. See supra note 156 and accompanying text; see also infra Appendix C (second column
entitled “Access to Evidence Before Interview”).
164. WALKER, supra note 22, at 3 (explaining that it is a “best practice” for investigators to
question officers involved in shootings or other possible incidents of misconduct as soon after the
incident as possible and noting that any delays in questioning may impair the ability to uncover
what happened).
165. Consent Decree at 23–25, United States v. City of Los Angeles, No. 00-cv-11769-GAFRC (C.D. Cal. June 15, 2001), http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-CA-0002-0006
.pdf [http://perma.cc/J2GK-PHXU] (mandating that supervisors report to the scene of categorical
uses of force twenty-four hours a day and immediately separate officers before taking their
statements).
166. Settlement Agreement and Stipulated [Proposed] Order of Resolution at 25–28, United
States v. Seattle, No. 12-cv-01282-JLR (W.D. Wash. July 27, 2013), http://www.justice.
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Orleans,167 and Albuquerque,168 require independent investigators to
report to the scene of a serious use of force as soon as possible.169 All
individuals involved in the incident should be separated immediately
to prevent officers from “conspiring to create a story that exonerates
any and all officers of misconduct.”170 These consent decrees
require independent investigators to take statements as quickly as
possible—generally at the scene of the incident.171
However, many police union contracts prevent management from
adopting these sorts of best practices. By delaying interrogations, and
in some cases providing officers with full access to all evidence against
them, these contracts provide officers with ample time to coordinate
stories in a way that shifts blame away from the police.
B. Disciplinary Records
As discussed in Part I.D, a handful of state laws already limit
public access to police disciplinary records.172 Such laws are troubling
because they prevent public oversight of internal police disciplinary
decisions. Perhaps even more troubling, though, is that many police
union contracts prevent even police chiefs from fully using officer
disciplinary records. Instead, many police union contracts mandate the
destruction of disciplinary records from officer personnel files after a
set period, or prevent supervisors from considering prior disciplinary
history when taking future employment action.
For example, the City of Cleveland’s contract requires
management to remove all verbal and written reprimands from

gov/crt/about/spl/documents/spd_consentdecree_7-27-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/RW8X-WFEV]
(requiring supervisors to both report to the scene of a use of injurious force and interview officers
separately as soon as possible thereafter).
167. Consent Decree at 25–26, United States v. City of New Orleans, No. 12-cv-01924-SMJCW (E.D. La. July 24, 2012) http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-LA-0001-0001.pdf
[http://perma.cc/PY76-PRBS] (requiring supervisors to report to the scene of serious uses of
force, separate officers, and take statements from both officers and witnesses soon thereafter).
168. Settlement Agreement at 22–25, United States v. City of Albuquerque, No. 1:14-cv-1025RB-SMV (D. N.M. Nov. 14, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2014/
12/19/apd_settlement_11-14-14.pdf [http://perma.cc/C5VA-X4RJ] (mandating an immediate
response and interviews by supervisors of officers involved in uses of force).
169. WALKER, supra note 22, at 3.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Lewis, Veltman & Landen, supra note 105 (listing states where police personnel records
are confidential either under a specific state statute—as in California, Delaware, and New York—
or under privacy or public-employee personnel exemptions to state open-record laws).
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officers’ personnel files after six months.173 Further, it requires that
supervisors must remove all disciplinary actions and penalties from
officers’ personnel files after two years.174 This means that after two
years, a police officer in Cleveland can have his or her personnel file
wiped clean—even if that officer has previously engaged in a pattern
of egregious misconduct that raises serious questions about whether he
or she is fit to serve as a police officer.

173. CITY OF CLEVELAND, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY OF
CLEVELAND AND CLEVELAND POLICE PATROLMEN’S ASSOCIATION NON-CIVILIAN
PERSONNEL 7 (2013) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
174. Id.
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Austin,175 Baltimore,176 Chicago,177 Cincinnati,178 Columbus,179
Honolulu,180 Jacksonville,181 Las Vegas,182 Louisville,183 Miami,184
Minneapolis,185 Seattle,186 and Washington, D.C.,187 are just a few of the
cities from this study that mandate the removal of disciplinary records
from personnel files over time. In total, eighty-seven of the cities
studied have language in their collective bargaining agreements that

175. CITY OF AUSTIN, supra note 146, at 54 (reducing suspensions of one to three days down
to a written reprimand after two or three years, depending on the officers’ conduct during that
time period).
176. CITY OF BALT., MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE BALTIMORE
CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT AND THE BALTIMORE CITY LODGE NO. 3, FRATERNAL ORDER OF
POLICE, INC. UNIT I, at 24 (2015) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (agreeing to expunge
allegations of misconduct from employees’ files after three years, if the complaint was found to
be unsustained or unfounded, or if the employee was otherwise found not guilty).
177. CITY OF CHI., supra note 148, at 10–11 (retaining a record of reprimands and suspensions
for between three and five years, but requiring the destruction of disciplinary records after five
years for most complaints and after seven years for complaints of criminal conduct or excessive
force).
178. CITY OF CINCINNATI, LABOR AGREEMENT BY AND BETWEEN QUEEN CITY LODGE
NO. 69 FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE AND THE CITY OF CINCINNATI 41–42 (2014) (on file with
the Duke Law Journal) (allowing the retention of records on disciplinary action that resulted in
fewer than thirty days of punishment to be kept for three years, while allowing their retention for
up to five years if the act resulted in thirty days or more of punishment).
179. CITY OF COLUMBUS, supra note 149, at 25–28 (mandating the retention of disciplinary
records in personnel files for between one and six years, depending on the type of record).
180. STATE OF HAWAII, AGREEMENT BETWEEN STATE OF HAWAII, CITY & COUNTY OF
HONOLULU, COUNTY OF HAWAII, COUNTY OF MAUI, AND COUNTY OF KAUAI AND STATE OF
HAWAII ORGANIZATION OF POLICE OFFICERS BARGAINING UNIT 12, at 42 (2011) (on file with
the Duke Law Journal) (requiring the removal of disciplinary records from personnel files after
two years, and mandating their destruction after four years, retaining only a summary notation).
181. CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY OF JACKSONVILLE AND THE
FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, POLICE OFFICERS THROUGH SERGEANTS 41 (2011) (on file
with the Duke Law Journal) (requiring that disciplinary information be discarded from personnel
files one to five years after the incident, depending on the severity of the punishment).
182. CITY OF LAS VEGAS, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN LAS VEGAS
METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT AND LAS VEGAS POLICE PROTECTIVE ASSOCIATION
38–39 (2014) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (requiring the purging of disciplinary records
after anywhere from three months to five years, depending on the severity of the violation).
183. CITY OF LOUISVILLE, supra note 155, at 22 (requiring the purging of so-called
“supervisor files” after one year).
184. CITY OF MIAMI, supra note 156, at 18 (requiring the purging of personnel files within five
years of termination or retirement, unless otherwise required by state law).
185. CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS, supra note 157, at 4 (requiring the purging of any records on a
disciplinary action that does not result in punishment).
186. CITY OF SEATTLE, supra note 160, at 14 (requiring the purging of disciplinary files after
the calendar year of the incident, plus three years).
187. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, supra note 161, at 18 (requiring, at the employee’s request, the
purging of disciplinary files in cases that are found to be unsubstantiated).
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requires the removal of personnel records at some point in the
future.188
Admittedly, there may be compelling policy reasons to erase
records of minor mistakes by police officers after a set length of time.
Evidence of prior wrongdoing may lose its probative or predictive
value as time passes. For example, the fact that an officer showed up
late to work five years ago likely has little to no bearing on his or her
fitness as an officer today. Even so, a pattern of more serious civilian
complaints over many decades—even if those complaints are rarely if
ever sustained—is often demonstrative of a problem requiring
management intervention.
Within the law enforcement community, early intervention
systems (EIS) have emerged as a so-called “best practice” over the last
two decades.189 These are computerized databases that document
“anywhere from five to twenty-five performance indicators” for
individual police officers over time.190 An emerging consensus suggests
that all civilian complaints and reported uses of force, regardless of the
outcome of any subsequent investigation, should be included in the
EIS.191 Because of the highly unstructured nature of police work, it is
often difficult to prove definitively that an officer engaged in
misconduct, in part because investigators must typically weigh the
officer’s word against a civilian’s word. While modern technological
tools like body cameras may somewhat level the playing field in these
investigations, these tools only provide one angle on interactions
between civilians and police.192
This is why EIS remains a critical tool for identifying problematic
police officers. If a department is using an effective EIS, an officer with
an unusually large number of civilian complaints relative to his or her
peers—even if these complaints are all or mostly not sustained—should
trigger additional management scrutiny.193 The story of Chicago police
188. See infra Appendix C (third column entitled “Limits Consideration of Disciplinary
History”).
189. WALKER, supra note 22, at 6.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. See Howard M. Wasserman, Moral Panics and Body Cameras, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 831,
840 (2015) (discussing the various limitations of body cameras, including the “length, clarity,
lighting, distance, angle, scope, steadiness, manner of shooting, [and] quality” of the video).
193. WALKER, supra note 22, at 6. Walker notes:
An EIS includes all citizen complaints and all reported uses of force regardless of the
outcome of the department investigation of each incident. The basic principle is that
an EIS should capture the most complete picture of an officer’s performance. Most
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officer Jason Van Dyke demonstrates how historical recordkeeping of
civilian complaints, when combined with an effective EIS, could
proactively identify dangerous officers before their behavior escalates.
As discussed above, civilians had filed twenty complaints against Van
Dyke in the years leading up to the Laquan McDonald shooting.194
None of these complaints resulted in punishment.195
This is not particularly surprising, given that records obtained by
Professor Craig Futterman revealed that less than 2 percent of the
28,567 civilian complaints against Chicago police officers between 2011
and 2015 resulted in discipline.196 If Chicago had used a comprehensive
EIS to assess officer risk, the city would have noticed that Van Dyke
was the subject of more civilian complaints than almost all other
Chicago police officers.197 By mandating the destruction of disciplinary
records in officer personnel records, many modern police union
contracts make it nearly impossible for police chiefs to identify such
troubling patterns in officer behavior.
C. Civilian Oversight
Since the early twentieth century, civil rights advocates have
recognized the importance of civilian oversight of police behavior. As
early as 1928, the Los Angeles Committee on Constitutional Rights
argued that private citizens should examine citizen complaints and
help citizens file complaints.198 The Wickersham Commission
Report199—one of the first national reports to identify and discuss
police misconduct as a widespread problem—recommended that
police departments establish civilian agencies to help victims of police

citizen complaints are not sustained, but it is a revealing indicator of an officer’s
performance if an officer receives complaints at a much higher rate than peer officers.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
194. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
195. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
196. CITIZENS POLICE DATA PROJECT, supra note 17.
197. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
198. JACK MCDEVITT, AMY FARRELL & W. CARSTEN ANDRESEN, NE. UNIV. INST. ON
RACE & JUSTICE, ENHANCING CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN THE REVIEW OF COMPLAINTS AND
USE OF FORCE IN THE BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT 3–4 (2005), http://www.nlg-npap.org/
sites/default/files/Northeasternreport12-05.pdf [https://perma.cc/UFE2-ZG92].
199. For a summary of some of the important findings from the Wickersham Commission
Report, see Samuel Walker, Introduction to RECORDS OF THE WICKERSHAM COMMISSION ON
LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, PART 1: RECORDS OF THE COMMITTEE ON OFFICIAL
LAWLESSNESS, at v–vi (1997), http://www.lexisnexis.com/documents/academic/upa_cis/1965_
wickershamcommpt1.pdf [https://perma.cc/EJ8Y-J5T2].
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misconduct file complaints.200 It was not until the last several decades,
though, that the number of civilian review boards increased
substantially—from thirteen in 1980,201 to thirty-eight in 1990,202 to
around seventy in 1995.203
According to one 2003 estimate, civilian review boards existed in
some form in around 80 percent of large American police
departments.204 But even as civilian review boards have grown in
importance, police unions have attempted to use the collective
bargaining process to block civilian power to oversee police discipline.
In total, forty-two municipalities examined in this study have union
contracts that limit civilian oversight in some way.205
Some contracts, like Miami’s collective bargaining agreement, go
so far as to dictate the composition of the administrative board tasked
with handing out discipline in cases of officer misconduct. Per the
Miami agreement, this administrative board consists exclusively of
fellow officers—the majority of whom are selected by the officer under
investigation.206 Other contracts, like those in Baltimore,207

200. Id.
201. Id.
202. SAMUEL WALKER & BETSY WRIGHT, POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, CITIZEN
REVIEW OF THE POLICE, 1994: A NATIONAL SURVEY 1 (1995), https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/
publications/abstract.aspx?ID=155242 [https://perma.cc/3LS6-TKDK].
203. Id.
204. Debra Livingston, The Unfulfilled Promise of Civilian Review, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
653, 653 (2003).
205. See infra Appendix B (column labeled “Limits Civilian Oversight”).
206. CITY OF MIAMI, supra note 156, at 28. The Miami CBA states:
All sworn bargaining unit members, prior to the final determination of a monetary fine,
forfeiture of time and/or suspension in excess of two (2) tours of duty, demotion or
dismissal shall, upon written request of the accused, if submitted within ten (10)
working days, be afforded a review of the recommended action by a board composed
of five (5) members of the Department, two (2) members selected by the Department
Head and three (3) members selected by the bargaining unit member from a standing
list.
Id.
207. CITY OF BALTIMORE, supra note 176, at 20, 22 (“Any employee suspended from duty
with pay shall be given a suspension hearing as soon as reasonable following the suspension from
duty, wherein a determination will be made at that time whether or not the employee shall remain
suspended with or without pay and/or be placed on administrative duties. . . . No civilians other
than an Administrative Law Judge may serve on a Departmental Hearing Board.”).
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Cleveland,208 San Antonio,209 and San Diego,210 keep civilians from
having the final say in police discipline. Several others, like those in
Austin,211 Columbus,212 Los Angeles,213 Seattle,214 St. Louis,215 and
Washington, D.C.,216 establish methods for disciplinary determinations
that do not seem to leave room for civilian oversight.
Police union opposition to civilian oversight is nothing new.
Historians have observed that many of the earliest experiments with
civilian review boards were killed off because of “implacable
opposition from police unions.”217 In fact, the rise of civilian oversight
may be one of the reasons for the rise of police unionization. As police
unions “began to resurface in the late 1960s, opposition to civilian

208. CITY OF CLEVELAND, supra note 173, at 56. The contract vests discipline power in the
chief of police and the director of public safety, who is a former Cleveland chief of police.
Discipline power is prohibited for Cleveland’s civilian Police Review Board. See id. at 93 (“The
undersigned parties to this Agreement agree that the Police Review Board cannot require the
Chief of Police or the Safety Director to act in violation of the terms of this agreement.”).
209. CITY OF SAN ANTONIO, supra note 158, at 85 (“Each board shall make independent
recommendations . . . . Such recommendations are advisory only and are not binding on the Chief.
The Citizen Advisory Action Board may not conduct a separate independent investigation but
may recommend to the Chief of Police that further investigations should be undertaken.”).
210. See CITY OF SAN DIEGO, supra note 159, at 53. Although this particular contract does
not clearly specify that the chief has the sole authority to impose discipline, it does seemingly
prevent policies from being implemented without the union’s consent.
211. CITY OF AUSTIN, supra note 146, at 43 (“The final decision as to appropriate discipline
is within the sole discretion of the Chief of Police . . . . Neither the OPM employees nor individual
members of the Panel shall publicly express agreement or disagreement with the final disciplinary
decision of the Chief, other than as set forth in the written recommendation.”).
212. CITY OF COLUMBUS, supra note 149, at 22–23 (“An immediate supervisor’s
recommendation to impose discipline at a higher level will require review by the member’s chain
of command, in which case the final decision will be made by the Chief of Police.”).
213. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BY AND BETWEEN THE
CITY OF LOS ANGELES AND THE LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE 93 (2011) (on file
with the Duke Law Journal) (providing that the police chief must make final disciplinary
decisions).
214. CITY OF SEATTLE, supra note 160, at 70 (“Only the Chief of Police . . . may impose
discipline on bargaining unit members.”).
215. CITY OF ST. LOUIS, AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY OF ST. LOUIS AND THE ST. LOUIS
POLICE OFFICER’S ASSOCIATION/FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE LODGE 68, at 19–20 (2014)
(on file with the Duke Law Journal) (establishing a commission without citizen participation to
make final determinations for all disciplinary action).
216. See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, supra note 161, at 10 (giving the chief of police the final
say on punishment).
217. David Alan Sklansky, Is the Exclusionary Rule Obsolete?, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 567,
572 (2008).
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review was one of its chief rallying cries.”218 Ironically, despite police
unions’ fears, the empirical and anecdotal evidence suggests that
civilians may not provide the sort of rigorous oversight of police
misconduct that many had hoped.219
Admittedly, civilian oversight has not proven to be “the panacea
many expected it to be.”220 Despite their limitations, however, civilian
review boards and other forms of community participation allow the
community to reassert sovereignty over police, which can empower
minority communities most subject to police abuse. Such oversight may
be important symbolically in building community trust, ensuring
transparency, and increasing the number of civilians willing to come
forward with complaints against the police. 221 Police unions in several
cities have been successful in using the collective bargaining process to
block or severely limit this sort of civilian oversight and engagement.
D. Investigation of Complaints
Many police union contracts disqualify certain classes of civilian
complaints. Thirty-two contracts limit management’s authority to
investigate anonymous civilian complaints.222 Another forty-six

218. Id.; see ROBERT M. FOGELSON, BIG-CITY POLICE 284–86 (1977); STEPHEN C. HALPERN,
POLICE-ASSOCIATION AND DEPARTMENT LEADERS: THE POLITICS OF CO-OPTATION 87 (1974);
JEROME H. SKOLNICK, THE POLITICS OF PROTEST 278–81 (Simon & Schuster 1969).
219. See, e.g., DOUGLAS W. PEREZ, COMMON SENSE ABOUT POLICE REVIEW 138 (1994)
(suggesting that civilians may be less likely to second-guess officers than fellow officers). It is also
worth noting that a Bureau of Justice Statistics study of approximately eight hundred police
departments found that departments that use civilian review boards receive twice as many
complaints against frontline officers, but sustain only around half as many complaints. Sklansky,
supra note 217, at 571–75. “The end result [is] that the number of sustained complaints in the two
groups, adjusting for the number of officers employed, appear[s] to be roughly equal.” Id. at 573.
This is only one of several critiques of civilian review boards. Other scholars have
suggested that civilian review boards, once constituted, are often dominated by police officers.
This is because a number of civilian review boards are not entirely populated by civilians. They
are often a mix of police and civilians. See, e.g., Eric J. Miller, Challenging Police Discretion, 58
HOW. L.J. 521, 547 (2015); Gregory D. Russell, The Political Ecology of Police Reform, 20
POLICING: INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 567, 567–76 (1997).
220. Livingston, supra note 204, at 653 (quoting Samuel Walker, Achieving Police
Accountability, in RESEARCH BRIEF 1998, at 2 (Ctr. on Crime, Cmtys., & Culture, Occasional
Paper Series No. 3, 1998)).
221. Sklansky, supra note 217, at 573 (“They may be important symbolically. They may be
important for transparency, and for building public confidence. If nothing else, the availability of
citizen review seems to make people much more willing to come forward with complaints against
the police, and that alone is significant.”).
222. See infra Appendix B.
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disqualify complaints after a set period of time,223 whether from the
initiation of the investigation or from the time of the alleged
misconduct. Albuquerque,224 Anchorage,225 Austin,226 Cincinnati,227
Cleveland,228 Columbus,229 El Paso,230 Glendale,231 Honolulu,232
Houston,233 Jersey City,234 Lincoln,235 San Antonio,236 San Diego,237 and
Seattle238 are some of the cities that limit the investigation of civilian
complaints in one of these two ways. Admittedly, there may be some

223. See infra Appendix B.
224. CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE, supra note 144, at 32 (limiting the length of internal
investigations to ninety days).
225. MUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE, supra note 145, at 8 (limiting the length of internal
investigations of civilian complaints to forty-five days after initiation).
226. CITY OF AUSTIN, supra note 146, at 48 (establishing a 180-day limit on disciplinary
actions).
227. CITY OF CINCINNATI, supra note 178, at 42 (applying a three-year statute of limitations
to disciplinary actions).
228. CITY OF CLEVELAND, supra note 173, at 10–11 (preventing the chief of police from
punishing officers for any noncriminal complaint filed more than six months after the alleged
event and for any charges brought after one year when based on an administrative investigation
lacking a citizen’s complaint).
229. CITY OF COLUMBUS, supra note 149, at 19–21 (stating that a citizen complaint must
generally be filed within sixty days of an alleged event in order for management to conduct an
investigation, and establishing a ninety-day period for investigations of civilian complaints).
230. CITY OF EL PASO, supra note 151, at 57 (stating that disciplinary action in noncriminal
matters must be taken within 180 days of an incident, and disciplinary action in criminal matters
must take place within two years of the incident, or within sixty days of its discovery, whichever
is later).
231. CITY OF GLENDALE, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN CITY OF
GLENDALE AND GLENDALE POLICE OFFICER’S COALITION 5–6 (2014) (on file with the Duke
Law Journal) (establishing strict time limitations on the investigation of anonymous complaints).
232. STATE OF HAW., supra note 180, at 22 (establishing a one-year statute of limitations for
investigations of misconduct and disciplinary action).
233. CITY OF HOUSTON, supra note 153, at 40–41 (establishing a 180-day statute of limitations
on disciplinary action based upon the date that the department learns of alleged wrongdoing).
234. CITY OF JERSEY CITY, AGREEMENT BETWEEN CITY OF JERSEY CITY AND JERSEY CITY
POLICE OFFICERS BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION 64–65 (2013) (on file with the Duke Law Journal)
(setting a time limit of fifteen to thirty days for disciplinary and criminal charges to be filed).
235. CITY OF LINCOLN, AGREEMENT BETWEEN LINCOLN POLICE UNION AND THE CITY OF
LINCOLN, NEBRASKA 19 (2014) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (prohibiting the
investigation of complaints that allege misconduct taking place more than forty-five days ago, as
well as requiring that the identity of complainants be revealed to officers).
236. CITY OF SAN ANTONIO, supra note 158, at 78–79 (establishing a 180-day statute of
limitations for internal investigations).
237. CITY OF SAN DIEGO, supra note 159, at 82–83 (establishing a one-year statute of
limitations for disciplinary action).
238. CITY OF SEATTLE, supra note 160, at 10 (establishing a 180-day statute of limitations for
internal investigations).
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value in avoiding endless disciplinary investigations and discouraging
frivolous civilian complaints. However, many of the limitations on the
investigation of civilian complaints found in modern union contracts
may go too far.
First, bans on anonymous complaints may discourage some
individuals from filing complaints against officers, particularly if they
have been victims of police brutality and fear retribution. The history
of American policing is rife with examples of police departments
making it difficult to file complaints against frontline officers, including
examples of police threatening those filing complaints.239 By
preventing management from investigating anonymous civilian
complaints, these contracts discourage some of the most vulnerable
individuals from seeking redress for officer misconduct. For instance,
these rules may discourage undocumented individuals from filing
complaints against problematic officers, for fear of the legal
consequences. This may allow patterns of egregious misconduct
against insular minorities to continue without intervention.
Second, clauses in police union contracts that establish statutes of
limitations for the investigation of misconduct may frustrate
accountability efforts. There is good reason to encourage the swift
investigation and adjudication of civilian complaints whenever
possible. It might incentivize investigators to act with reasonable
diligence, so as to ensure the freshness of witness recollections and the
availability of physical evidence. Nevertheless, some particularly
egregious incidents of police misconduct may not come to light until
years after they occurred. For example, one of the most notorious
instances of documented police misconduct in American history is the
so-called “midnight crew” led by Chicago Police Commander Jon
Burge between 1972 and 1991.240 Burge and a handful of fellow officers

239. The events surrounding the Rodney King beating provide one example of this problem.
After the horrendous incident, one of the passengers present at the incident told Paul King,
Rodney King’s brother, about what had happened. Paul King went to the Foothill Police Station
in Los Angeles to file a formal complaint on his brother’s behalf. The sergeant at the Foothill
Police Station brought King’s brother to an interview room, where he waited for thirty minutes.
Then, the sergeant allegedly questioned Paul about whether he had been in any trouble—a
question that understandably troubled King’s brother, who was there to merely report his
brother’s mistreatment. CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 17, at 9–10.
240. Hal Dardick & John Byrne, Mayor: Approval of Burge Victims Fund a Step Toward
‘Removing a Stain,’ CHI. TRIB. (May 6, 2015, 5:40 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/ct-citycouncil-rauner-cupich-met-20150506-story.html [https://perma.cc/867E-6LP3] (describing efforts
that Chicago has made to help victims of Burge’s torture, which lasted nearly two decades);
Adeshina Emmanuel, How Union Contracts Shield Police Departments from DOJ Reforms, IN
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tortured over 100 people, mostly black men, in Chicago’s impoverished
South Side.241 The officers allegedly used “electric shocks, beatings,
smotherings and simulated Russian roulette.”242 It was not until 1993
that Chicago fired Burge—although his firing was not because of his
decades of violence.243 Even as evidence of their misconduct became
public, however, Chicago’s five-year statute of limitations—known as
the “Burge rule”—prevented Chicago from investigating Burge and his
fellow officers.244 In sum, a substantial number of these contracts limit
the types of complaints that supervisors can investigate, either through
statutes of limitations or bars on the investigation of anonymous
complaints, thereby frustrating accountability efforts.
E. Arbitration
Finally, 115 of the union contracts studied in this Article contain
language that permits or requires the use of arbitration in adjudicating
officer appeals of disciplinary measures. Admittedly, arbitration is a
common mechanism for adjudicating disputes in the public labor
sector. State laws frequently bar certain classes of public employees,
like police officers and firefighters, from striking in cases of labor
disputes.245 Thus, mandatory arbitration provides a release valve in
cases of intractable contractual disputes between police unions and
management. To be clear, this Article makes no objection to the use of
arbitration to settle most contractual disputes. Its use in disciplinary
appeals, though, has raised serious concerns among policing scholars.
Policing scholars have previously recognized that using arbitration
as a disciplinary tool can frustrate police accountability. For one thing,
THESE TIMES (June 21, 2016), http://inthesetimes.com/features/police-killings-union-contracts.
html [https://perma.cc/D6QT-GBR8] (providing a brief description of the Burge incidents and
using the phrase “midnight crew”).
241. Dardick & Byrne, supra note 240.
242. Id.
243. Christina Sterbenz, A Group of Rogue Cops Known as the ‘Midnight Crew’ Tortured
Dozens of People for Decades—and Now Chicago Is Paying Millions for It, BUS. INSIDER
(May 6, 2015, 3:13 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/r-chicago-council-approves-reparationsfor-police-torture-victims-2015-5 [https://perma.cc/NRM6-CMC8] (“Burge was fired in 1993
(although not directly as a result of the violence) and later convicted of lying about police torture
in testimony he gave in civil lawsuits.”).
244. Emmanuel, supra note 240 (“Flint Taylor, a founding partner of the People’s Law Office
who represented many Burge victims, blames this on what he calls ‘the Burge rule’—unless a
police chief signs off, investigations of civilian complaints are subject to a five-year statute of
limitations.”).
245. SANES & SCHMITT, supra note 58, at 8 (showing that only Ohio and Hawaii have not
explicitly barred police strikes).
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arbitration almost exclusively results in reductions in disciplinary
penalties handed down against officers found guilty of professional
misconduct.246 It also allows third parties, often from outside the
community, to make final disciplinary decisions that can go against the
will of police supervisors or civilian oversight entities.247
In this way, arbitration can arguably constitute an antidemocratic
limitation on public oversight of law enforcement behavior.
Additionally, most states make arbitration decisions binding and limit
judicial review of arbitration decisions.248 Given that the Supreme
Court has held that the “refusal of courts to review the merits of an
arbitration award is . . . proper,” an arbitrator “can be wrong on the
facts and wrong on the law and a court will not overturn the arbitrator’s
opinion.”249
V. IMPLICATIONS AND AVENUES FOR REFORM
This Article’s findings are consistent with the hypothesis that
police union contracts sometimes establish problematic internal
disciplinary procedures that serve as barriers to accountability.
Collective bargaining advocates have previously argued that the
negotiation of disciplinary procedures by public-employee unions
should not result in any problematic provisions because “[i]t will rarely
be in the union’s interest, . . . even where feasible, to negotiate
provisions that protect incompetent or abusive employees.”250
However, it appears that expansive readings of state labor laws by
employee-relations boards and courts have opened the door for police

246. See, e.g., CITY OF BURBANK, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE CITY
BURBANK AND THE BURBANK POLICE OFFICERS’ ASSOCIATION 57 (2009) (on file with the
Duke Law Journal) (limiting arbitrators’ ability to increase punishment, but providing no such
limitation on their ability to decrease punishment); David Armstrong, Second Chance for Bad
Cops, BOS. GLOBE, May 21, 2000, at A1 (providing an example of an agency that limits police
officers’ accountability).
247. See, e.g., Jane Prendergast & Robert Anglen, 10 Fired Officers Returned to Force: City
Lost All Cases Taken to Arbitration, CIN. ENQUIRER, Jan. 18, 2011, at A1 (describing how the
City of Cincinnati lost a series of these appeals during arbitration, resulting in the city being forced
to reduce punishment or reinstate officers whom the city had felt deserved harsher punishments).
248. Stoughton, supra note 45, at 2210.
249. Id. (first quoting Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960);
then quoting WILL AITCHISON, THE RIGHTS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS 98 (6th ed.
2009)).
250. Hodges, supra note 70, at 147. Further, Professor Ann Hodges predicted that “union
proposals for disciplinary standards and procedures will not be inimical to the merit principle.”
Id. at 146.
OF
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unions to negotiate the inclusion of a range of questionable procedures
that may “protect incompetent or abusive employees.”251 Excessively
delaying interrogations of officers after alleged misconduct allows
officers to coordinate stories in a way that deflects responsibility for
wrongful behavior. The destruction of disciplinary records makes it
more difficult for supervisors to identify officers engaged in a pattern
of misconduct. The disqualification of entire classes of civilian
complaints prevents supervisors from even investigating potentially
abusive behavior. Limitations on civilian oversight and arbitration
clauses rob the public of the opportunity to monitor police behavior.
This Part discusses the implications of these findings for the broader
literature on police regulation and offers some normative
recommendations for reforming police labor law.
A. Implications for Police-Reform Efforts
The findings from this study suggest that internal police
department procedures may limit the effectiveness of existing policereform efforts. For most of American history, policymakers have relied
on an array of external legal mechanisms to discourage police
wrongdoing. The Supreme Court has barred the admission of some
evidence obtained by police officers in violation of the Constitution via
the exclusionary rule.252 Federal law empowers victims of police
misconduct to bring civil suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against police
officers, and in some cases police departments.253 Under 18 U.S.C.
§ 242, federal prosecutors can hold a police officer criminally liable for
willfully depriving a person of civil rights.254 And state prosecutors can
bring criminal charges against police officers, like any other person, in
the event their conduct violates state criminal statutes. In a previous
work, I have described this array of external legal mechanisms as “costraising misconduct regulations” because they do not force local police
departments to enact specific policies to combat police misconduct, but

251. Id. at 147.
252. See supra note 40.
253. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (establishing a statutory right for private litigants to bring civil
suits against state agents who violate their “rights, privileges, or immunities”).
254. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2012) (making it a federal crime for a police officer to violate a person’s
constitutional rights under color of law while acting willfully and placing heavy criminal penalties
on such behavior that leads to bodily injury); U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, WHO IS
GUARDING THE GUARDIANS?: A REPORT ON POLICE PRACTICES 143 (1981), http://hdl.handle.
net/2027/uc1.32106015219253 [https://perma.cc/9TLE-4V4V].
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instead, they merely raise the cost of officer misconduct by exacting
monetary, evidentiary, or criminal penalties.255
In theory, as these external legal mechanisms increase the cost
borne by police departments in cases of officer misconduct, police
supervisors should rationally respond by improving officer training and
designing internal procedures to ferret out officer wrongdoing. Yet in
many of the nation’s largest cities, supervisors cannot always respond
to external legal pressure by implementing rigorous disciplinary
procedures because of collective bargaining agreements, civil service
laws, and LEOBRs. Scholars have long lamented the apparent
ineffectiveness of external legal mechanisms in bringing about reform
in local police practices.256 A growing consensus in the late twentieth
century emerged that these external, cost-raising mechanisms were
sometimes ineffective at transforming the organizational culture or
practices of police departments.257 In the past, participants in this
conversation have not fully recognized the ways that police labor and
employment law may contribute to questionable internal disciplinary
measures. Even when faced with the sting of evidentiary exclusion or
the heavy financial burden of civil suits, police union contracts can
make it challenging for police chiefs to hold officers accountable for
wrongdoing.
It is also important to recognize the limitations of this Article’s
findings. It remains unclear whether, and to what extent, the collective
bargaining process contributes to the lax disciplinary procedures
identified in this Article. Even without the negotiation of internal
procedures via the collective bargaining process, communities may
have nevertheless enacted similar procedures through alternative
processes. This Article does not show a causal relationship between the
use of collective bargaining and the implementation of questionable
disciplinary procedures. Nevertheless, this Article’s findings are
consistent with the hypothesis that police labor law can frustrate
accountability efforts, thereby limiting the effectiveness of traditional,
cost-raising forms of police regulation. More research is necessary to

255. Rushin, Federal Enforcement, supra note 43, at 3196.
256. On the limitations of these existing mechanisms, see supra notes 40–42 and
accompanying text.
257. See generally Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 453, 515–25 (2004) (describing the organizational roots of police
misconduct).
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understand the relationship between collective bargaining and internal
disciplinary procedures.
Police union contracts can also thwart federal efforts to reform
local police departments via structural reform litigation. In 1994,
Congress authorized the U.S. attorney general to seek equitable relief
against local and state police departments engaging in a pattern or
practice of unconstitutional misconduct under § 14141 of the Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act.258 Effectively, this statute
gives the DOJ the power to compel cities, under threat of litigation, to
invest in costly reform measures aimed at curbing officer
wrongdoing.259 The DOJ has used § 14141 to investigate and reform
dozens of police departments.260 The DOJ has been careful to state in
consent decrees and memorandums of understanding—like the one in
Pittsburgh in 1997—that “[n]othing in this Decree is intended to alter
the collective bargaining agreement between the City and the Fraternal
Order of Police.”261 Were the DOJ to attempt to overturn any language
in Pittsburgh’s collective bargaining agreement, the Fraternal Order of
Police may have had standing to challenge the federal consent decree,
which could have led to a broader challenge to the constitutionality of
the DOJ’s recommended reforms. So instead, the DOJ has opted to
work around police union contracts. As the former chief of the Special
Litigation Section of the Civil Rights Division explained, this means
that police union contracts narrow the field of reforms that the DOJ
can request in § 14141 cases.262

258. 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for any governmental authority . . . to
engage in a pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers . . . that deprives persons
of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution . . . .”). Under § 14141,
relief can be sought “[w]henever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe” that there
is a pattern or practice of misconduct by “obtain[ing] appropriate equitable and declaratory relief
to eliminate the pattern or practice” in a civil action. Id.
259. See generally Rushin, Federal Enforcement, supra note 43, at 1367–77 (providing a
detailed look at the DOJ’s use of § 14141, based on semistructured interviews with stakeholders
involved in the process).
260. Rushin, Using Data, supra note 122, at 157 (stating that the DOJ investigated about fiftyfive police departments and reached settlements with twenty-two of these agencies between 1994
and 2012).
261. Consent Decree at 4, United States v. City of Pittsburgh, No. 97-cv-00354 (W.D. Pa. Feb.
26, 1997), http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-PA-0003-0002.pdf [https://perma.cc/
W65H-DSV4].
262. Jonathan M. Smith, Police Unions Must Not Block Reform, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/30/opinion/police-unions-must-not-block-reform.html [https://
perma.cc/TM8G-G8R9] (stating that “[i]n big cities, where police unions have political clout, rigid
union contracts also restricted the ability of police chiefs and civilian oversight bodies to tackle
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In at least seven of these § 14141 cases—Albuquerque, Los
Angeles, Newark, Pittsburgh, Portland, Seattle, and the Virgin
Islands—existing collective bargaining provisions presented a
roadblock to federal reform efforts.263 In Pittsburgh, the union contract
has prevented investigators from considering all complaints because of
a clause that establishes a ninety-day statute of limitations on civiliancomplaint investigations.264 In Portland, a union contract provision that
prevents investigators from talking to officers for forty-eight hours
after a use-of-force incident has hampered federal efforts to reform
internal investigations.265 And in Newark, the Fraternal Order of Police
has tried to block the creation of a civilian oversight entity that could
review complaints, impose disciplinary actions, and recommend
policies to improve policing, arguing that such a move would violate its
collective bargaining agreement.266
When Congress passed § 14141, numerous policing scholars hailed
the measure as one of the most important regulations of officer
misconduct in American history, claiming that it could potentially
transform the organizational culture in American police
departments.267 Until recently, though, little scholarship has recognized
how state labor laws can frustrate the enforcement of § 14141. In sum,
the evidence from this Article suggests that police union contracts may
pose an underappreciated barrier to police reform.
B. Reforming Police Labor Laws
Police officers need reasonable procedural safeguards during
disciplinary investigations. At the same time, these procedural
protections should not go so far as to shield offending officers from
accountability. Unfortunately, in many of the nation’s largest cities, it
appears that the balance may have tipped too heavily in favor of
misconduct” and “[a]s a result, an officer involved in a shooting often cannot be interviewed at
the scene; internal affairs investigators have to wait days to get a statement”).
263. Emmanuel, supra note 240 (citing these cities as cases where DOJ reform efforts were
stalled or delayed because of collective bargaining provisions, and stating that, “[i]n these cities,
police contract protections appear to have weakened or stalled efforts to improve the handling of
police misconduct, to create or extend civilian oversight, or to establish early-warning systems for
problem cops”).
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 781,
798–99 (2006); see also Armacost, supra note 257, at 457 (stating that § 14141 is “perhaps the most
promising legal mechanism” for reducing police misconduct).
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protecting police officers while handcuffing internal investigations. In
many localities across the country, police officers receive more
procedural protections than other government employees during
disciplinary investigations.268 If, as hypothesized, the structure of the
collective bargaining process contributes to the development of these
questionable disciplinary procedures, policymakers ought to rethink
the structure of the collective bargaining process in American police
departments. To address this hypothesized problem, this Article
suggests a few ways that states could amend labor laws to increase
transparency and community participation in the development of
police disciplinary procedures.
First, states could amend their labor laws to require municipalities
to make collective bargaining sessions over police disciplinary
procedures open to the public. In so doing, states could require
municipalities to make drafts of police disciplinary procedures
available to the public before ratification. Or, perhaps more radically,
states could democratize the development of police disciplinary
measures by requiring that they be developed outside of the collective
bargaining process in a manner that incorporates input from the public
and relevant interest groups.
This public process could take many different forms. Communities
could elect civilians to a commission tasked with the creation of police
disciplinary procedures, with recommendations from police
management and union leaders. Communities could establish noticeand-comment procedures, similar to those employed by many
administrative agencies, to promulgate disciplinary policies.
Conversely, states could require communities to establish police
disciplinary procedures in the same manner that they establish
municipal ordinances—presumably through a public hearing and vote
by local elected officials. Any of these approaches would provide the
public with a greater opportunity to shape police disciplinary measures
than currently exists in many localities, while still permitting police
unions to negotiate collectively on a wide range of topics, including
salaries, benefits, retirement, vacation time, holidays, promotion
standards, and more.
Increased transparency and public participation may result in
more balanced police disciplinary procedures that do not afford
268. See, e.g., Stern, supra note 141 (discussing the special rights that Louisiana “gives law
enforcement officers suspected of illegal conduct [that go] far beyond those afforded to regular
citizens”).
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officers an unreasonable advantage during internal investigations.
First, these proposals would increase participation by stakeholders
whom state labor laws currently exclude from the traditional collective
bargaining process—namely, minority groups most at risk of
experiencing police misconduct. In most states, collective bargaining
happens outside of the public view. Only eight states require
municipalities to conduct bargaining sessions related to police
disciplinary policies in public.269 Only four states require municipalities
to make drafts of police disciplinary procedures public before ratifying
collective bargaining agreements.270
The collective bargaining process generally excludes individuals
most at risk of experiencing police misconduct. During these
negotiations, a typical bargaining team for the municipality may
include a chief negotiator, the budget or finance director, legal counsel,
a representative from human resources, the police chief or some other
high-ranking supervisor from the police department, and middle
management from the police department like sergeants, lieutenants,
and captains.271 The police union bargaining team will typically include
a union representative, a union negotiator, and in some cases, a handful
of rank-and-file officers.272 Typically missing from the bargaining table
is any party likely to prioritize the interests of minority groups most at
risk of police misconduct. This Article’s proposal represents a more
collaborative approach to the negotiation of police disciplinary policies
that would ensure the participation of more relevant stakeholders.
Second, some of these proposals would force municipalities to
consider the merits of police disciplinary procedures on their own,
rather than having them become a bargaining chip in a broader
budgetary negotiation. As currently structured, most municipalities
negotiate with police unions about disciplinary procedures alongside
salaries, benefits, vacation time, promotion procedures, and more.
Under these conditions, it is not uncommon for the two sides to make

269. These states are Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Montana, Oregon, and Texas.
Two states—Alaska and Colorado—only provide for such transparency in collective bargaining
sessions involving teachers. ABRAHAM, supra note 39, at 5–8 (providing links to various state
statutes).
270. These states are Florida, Montana, Ohio, and Texas. Id.
271. SAM ASHBAUGH, GOV’T FIN. OFFICERS ASS’N, AN ELECTED OFFICIAL’S GUIDE TO
NEGOTIATING AND COSTING LABOR CONTRACTS 11–13 (2003), http://www.gfoa.org/sites/
default/files/AnElectedOfficialsGuideToNegotiatingAndCostingLaborContracts.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/9PAL-6TC7].
272. Id. at 14.
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trade-offs—for example, a police union may accept a smaller than
desired raise in officer salaries in exchange for more control over
disciplinary procedures.273
Even for municipalities that are ideologically opposed to such
disciplinary concessions, the temptation can be irresistible if such a
concession results in a smaller hit to the municipal budget. Chicago
presents a cautionary tale of how municipalities that are strapped for
cash have strong incentives to offer concessions on officer
accountability in return for lower officer salaries. In the wake of the
Laquan McDonald shooting, an investigation by the Chicago Tribune
found that “[f]rom the moment Chicago’s Fraternal Order of Police
started negotiating its first contract with City Hall 35 years ago, the
union identified an issue that would prove key to its members: ensuring
officers had robust protections when they were investigated for
misconduct.”274
By contrast, cash-strapped Chicago officials have been primarily
concerned with holding “tight on the bottom line” by avoiding
significant increases in salaries and benefits.275 When it became
apparent during negotiations that Chicago—a city that was facing a
significant budget crunch—could not meet union salary demands, the
Fraternal Order of Police instead demanded that Chicago “pony up”
by making concessions on disciplinary procedures.276 And once
Chicago agreed to these lenient disciplinary procedures, it found it
difficult to revert back.277
The proposals in this Article could help remedy this problem. By
forcing municipalities and police unions to negotiate disciplinary
procedures in transparent hearings, the public may be put on notice if
cities are using lax disciplinary procedures as a bargaining chip to
secure lower officer salaries. This, in turn, may discourage such trade273. Id. at 66 (advising government officials to avoid the temptation to trade management
control of employees in exchange for economic concessions); John Chase & David Heinzmann,
Cops Traded Away Pay for Protections in Police Contracts, CHI. TRIB. (May 20, 2016,
8:36 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-chicago-police-contracts-fop20160520-story.html [https://perma.cc/3H2D-DH24].
274. Chase & Heinzmann, supra note 273.
275. Id.
276. Id. (quoting former Fraternal Order of Police President John Dineen, who said candidly
that “[t]he city didn’t have a lot of money but they wanted to keep the police happy, so they’d tell
us what we’d get” and “[i]t was always working conditions versus money”).
277. Id. (discussing in part the efforts by the city to establish a shorter waiting period before
interviewing police officers after officer-involved shootings and describing how these efforts were
ultimately overturned by an arbitrator ruling in 2011).
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offs, thereby forcing the municipalities and police unions to negotiate
the content of disciplinary procedures as a standalone issue, with the
benefit of public input.
Third, and relatedly, transparency is likely to reduce regulatory
capture and corruption.278 Scholars have documented that police
unions are a powerful political constituency.279 Police union support
can be pivotal in local and state elections.280 Thus, there is legitimate
concern that the collective bargaining process in police departments
“amount[s] to a division of spoils” rather than a thoughtful
compromise.281 By opening up the negotiation process to the public,
relevant stakeholders should, theoretically, be able to monitor the
actions of municipal officials during the negotiation of police union
contracts and prevent the kind of troubling disciplinary trade-offs that
have happened in major cities like Chicago.
C. Limitations on Reform
Nevertheless, police union leaders and other critics may object to
increasing transparency and public participation in the development of
police disciplinary procedures for several reasons. To begin with, some
point out that this Article’s proposal treats police officers differently
than other public employees. State labor laws allow virtually all other
groups of public employees to bargain about disciplinary procedures
without the additional burden of a public, participatory process as
proposed in this Article. Why should police officers be any different?
This Article argues that, because of the power wielded by frontline
officers and the high social cost of officer misconduct,282 the public

278. See generally Mehmet Bac, Corruption, Connections and Transparency: Does a Better
Screen Imply a Better Scene?, 107 PUB. CHOICE 87 (2001) (arguing that a higher level of
transparency increases the probability of corruption detection); Catharina Lindstedt & Daniel
Naurin, Transparency Is Not Enough: Making Transparency Effective in Reducing Corruption, 31
INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 301 (2010) (arguing that while transparency is an important tool for reducing
corruption in government institutions, it is most effective when there is a strong education system,
an independent press, and free and fair elections).
279. See, e.g., Douthat, supra note 123 (noting that even among conservative Republicans who
generally oppose public-employee unionization in other contexts, police unions have maintained
strong public support; in fact, police unions have been “insulated from any real pressure to
reform”).
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. See generally, e.g., VICTOR M. RIOS, PUNISHED: POLICING THE LIVES OF BLACK AND
LATINO BOYS (2011) (describing the social costs of negative police interactions with communities
of color in Oakland, California).
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ought to have greater input in the development of police disciplinary
procedures. Unlike other public employees, police officers generally
carry firearms, make investigatory stops, conduct arrests, and use lethal
force when needed. Additionally, municipalities necessarily give
frontline police officers significantly more discretion than other public
employees.283 Officers encounter “people when they are both most
threatening and most vulnerable, when they are angry, when they are
frightened, when they are desperate, when they are drunk, when they
are violent, and when they are ashamed.”284
While discretion is a necessary part of policing, it is inevitable that
some officers will abuse such discretion. The “supervision of
subordinates with broad discretion and responsibilities” is especially
tough, meaning that superiors cannot meaningfully “hold officers
accountable for everything all the time.”285 Some misconduct is an
unavoidable part of having a police force.286 Given their discretion and

283. Charles D. Breitel, Controls in Criminal Law Enforcement, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 427, 427
(1960) (explaining the necessity of discretion in police work and defining discretion as “the power
to consider all circumstances and then determine whether any legal action is to be taken” and “if
so taken, of what kind and degree, and to what conclusion”).
The academic literature has long observed that, as frontline workers, police officers need
discretion to complete their jobs. In the past, it has observed that there are two different types of
discretion in modern police work. First, there is the discretion officers must exercise when they
decide which laws to enforce most aggressively. Second, there is the discretion officers must
exercise in how they enforce those laws. See generally MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL
BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICES (1980) (observing how
police, as street-level bureaucrats, have the ability to exercise influence over public policy);
STEVEN MAYNARD-MOODY & MICHAEL MUSHENO, COPS, TEACHERS, COUNSELORS: STORIES
FROM THE FRONT LINES OF PUBLIC SERVICE (2003) (analyzing how street-level bureaucrats like
police officers have to deal with competing tensions of law abidance and cultural abidance);
Herman Goldstein, Police Discretion: The Ideal Versus the Real, 23 POLICE ADMIN. REV. 140
(1963) (arguing that police officers must make decisions on which laws to enforce rigidly, and
which laws to enforce less aggressively, thereby shaping the meaning of the law).
If police did not have the ability to exercise discretion, “the criminal law would be ordered
but intolerable.” Breitel, supra, at 427. This has been well understood going back to the
President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, which recognized
the importance of discretion. The authors of that report noted that police “are charged with
performing [their jobs] where all eyes are upon them and where the going is always roughest, on
the street.” PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENF’T & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF
CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 91 (1967), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/42.pdf [https://perma.cc/
UUB9-4QYB].
284. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENF’T & ADMIN OF JUSTICE, supra note 283, at 91.
285. LIPSKY, supra note 283, at 164.
286. In the last century, the academic literature has recognized countless examples of how
police discretion is invariably tied to some misconduct. One of the first national recognitions of
widespread misconduct among police officers came in 1931, when the National Commission on
Law Observance and Enforcement, appointed by President Herbert Hoover, released the
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legal authority to use force, misconduct by police officers can have far
more serious—and deadly—consequences than misconduct by other
public employees. A single “bad cop . . . can leave his victim dead or
permanently damaged, and under the right circumstances one cop’s
bad call—or a group of cops’ habitual [bad behavior]—can be the spark
that leaves a city like Baltimore in flames.”287 Thus, there is a
compelling public policy need for the public to have greater input in
the development of police disciplinary procedures.
Second, critics may argue that a transparent and public
negotiation about disciplinary procedures could reduce efficiency and
result in fewer genuine, good-faith discussions about the merits of
different disciplinary regimes. Public participation may result in each
side appealing to the “lowest common denominator” and pandering to
constituents during public hearings, rather than engaging in frank
discussions about the complex array of issues at stake.288 Public
negotiations may also be less likely to result in amicable compromises,
as negotiators may be less willing to make trade-offs on particularly
contentious issues if facing immediate public backlash.289
Admittedly, closed-door labor negotiations can offer some real
advantages. However, the risk of such closed-door negotiations is that
the resulting compromise will not adequately reflect community
values.290 This risk is heightened in the context of police disciplinary
procedures in most states, where those individuals who are most at risk
Wickersham Commission Report. Since the Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement, “no
fewer than six national commissions [have] examined various dimensions” of police misconduct
in the United States. Michael S. Scott, Progress in American Policing? Reviewing the National
Reviews, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 171, 172 (2008). These reports, along with other academic
research, have found certain categories of misconduct to be common across different policing
agencies: racial profiling, excessive use of force, unlawful searches and seizures, failures to
cooperate with investigations involving fellow officers, dishonesty at trial, and the planting of
evidence. Kami Chavis Simmons, New Governance and the “New Paradigm” of Police
Accountability: A Democratic Approach to Police Reform, 59, CATH. U. L. REV. 373, 380–81
(2010).
287. Douthat, supra note 123.
288. Frederick Schauer, Transparency in Three Dimensions, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1339, 1349–
50 (2011) (acknowledging that transparency can create “a decision-making environment in which
the lowest common denominator dimensions of widespread public involvement would cause bad
arguments to drive out good ones”).
289. See David Stasavage, Does Transparency Make a Difference? The Example of the
European Council of Ministers, in CHRISTOPHER HOOD & DAVID HEALD, TRANSPARENCY: THE
KEY TO BETTER GOVERNANCE? 165, 169 (2006) (stating that “secretive environments help to
produce compromises in bargaining”).
290. See Schauer, supra note 288, at 1348–50 (describing the democratic value of transparency
in government decisionmaking).
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from officer wrongdoing have little say in the current collective
bargaining process. A genuine and frank discussion of police
disciplinary procedures ought to include the members of the public
most at risk of falling victim to police brutality.
Third, some may worry that a public process, particularly at a time
when police are under significant national scrutiny,291 could swing the
pendulum in the opposite direction; that is, it may result in virtually no
procedural protections for officers facing disciplinary investigations.
While potentially problematic, this result seems highly unlikely. For
one, police officers are still typically protected by civil service laws that
establish basic procedures for hiring, promotion, and in some cases
disciplinary procedures.292 Police officers themselves remain one of the
most powerful political constituencies in the United States.293
In fact, police officers are such a powerful political constituency
that civil rights advocates may worry that even a transparent and public
process will not correct the underlying problem. Even with more
transparency and public participation, police unions may still be able
to lobby local political leaders for excessive procedural protections
during disciplinary investigations. For evidence of this objection, we
need look no further than LEOBRs, which state legislatures passed
after public debate and hearings. If transparency and public
participation did not prevent the passage of LEOBRs in sixteen states,
why would it prevent municipalities from passing similarly protective
measures after a public debate?
No doubt, increasing transparency and public participation in the
development of police disciplinary procedures will not cure all
problems. Many municipalities will still opt for overly protective
procedures that have the effect of limiting police accountability and
oversight. Nevertheless, there is still good reason to believe that the
addition of public participation and transparency will result in more
balanced disciplinary procedures. Only 32 percent of states have
passed LEOBRs through their state legislatures, while it appears that
a higher portion of large municipalities that engage in collective
291. See generally HEATHER MAC DONALD, THE WAR ON COPS: HOW THE NEW ATTACK
LAW AND ORDER MAKES EVERYONE LESS SAFE (2016) (arguing that the current political
environment has put unreasonable pressure on police officers, making them less aggressive and
contributing to an uptick in crime).
292. See supra Part I.B.
293. See generally Rushin, Using Data, supra note 122, at 135–54 (discussing the political
power of police groups as compared to the victims of police misconduct and arguing that these
political barriers make bottom-up, organic police reform challenging).
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bargaining with their police forces have restricted internal
investigations in some potentially problematic way.294 In other words,
police officers have been more successful in obtaining unreasonably
burdensome procedural protections through the collective bargaining
process than through more public processes.
Fourth, some may claim that frontline officers’ inability to
negotiate disciplinary procedures through the traditional collective
bargaining process may result in reduced morale and other forms of
pushback.295 Admittedly, one of the benefits of collective bargaining
for disciplinary procedures is that it may promote fairness, reduce
arbitrary discipline, and improve employee morale.296 In other policing
contexts, there is evidence that external attempts to overhaul
disciplinary procedures without support from police unions resulted in
opposition, decreases in enforcement, and ultimately de-policing.297
From a procedural justice perspective,298 it may be advantageous to
give frontline police officers or their union representatives a voice in
the development of disciplinary procedures.
But none of the proposals in this Article would prevent police
unions or frontline officers from having a seat at the table in the
development of police disciplinary procedures. Instead, this Article
merely proposes opening up the development of police disciplinary
procedures to the public—either through increasing transparency and
public participation in the collective bargaining process or through
294. For a description and evaluation of LEOBRS from fifteen states, see supra Part I.C and
infra Appendix C.
295. See, e.g., Fisk & Richardson, supra note 47 (manuscript at 28, 52–53) (explaining how
officers who are excluded from the process of establishing internal disciplinary policies may feel
“compelled to oppose new policies for fear that the policy will be implemented punitively or
unfairly as a way to discipline rank and file who are unpopular with management,” and further
explaining how “failing to give [frontline officers] any voice” in designing internal policies may
fuel resentment because it communicates to them “just how unimportant their views” are and
“just how low their status” is within the department).
296. Hodges, supra note 70, at 98–99 (“Protection from arbitrary or unjust discipline is a
primary motivation for employee unionization.”); Charles C. Killingsworth, Grievance
Adjudication in Public Employment, 13 ARB. J. 3, 15 (1958) (stating that impartial grievance
procedures are important for employee morale).
297. See generally, e.g., Rushin & Edwards, supra note 82 (demonstrating empirically how
federal intervention in police departments is associated with a temporary uptick in crime rates,
likely from officers pulling back on street policing).
298. See Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30
CRIME & JUST. 283, 283 (2003) (“Legal authorities gain when they receive deference and
cooperation from the public. Considerable evidence suggests that the key factor shaping public
behavior is the fairness of the processes legal authorities use when dealing with members of the
public.”).
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democratizing the development of disciplinary procedures. In either
scenario, police unions would still play an important role, either as a
party during contract negotiations or as a powerful political
constituency during a legislative process.
This proposal merely provides other stakeholders with a more
direct role in collaboratively developing disciplinary procedures. While
transparency and public participation will not prevent all problematic
provisions in police union contracts, sunlight has proven time and time
again to be the “best of disinfectants.”299
CONCLUSION
Few cases better illustrate the complex relationship between
police misconduct investigations and labor law than the tragic death of
Alton Sterling in Baton Rouge. On July 5, 2016, multiple bystanders
recorded the encounter between Sterling and two Baton Rouge police
officers.300 These videos appeared to show the officers shooting Sterling
six times in the chest and back from point-blank range.301 In the
aftermath of this horrific event, the public was left with more questions
than answers. Was Sterling armed? Did the officers need to use deadly
force? And would the disciplinary procedures allow justice to be
served?
Labor law protections may make it difficult to answer these
questions. Under Louisiana’s LEOBR and Baton Rouge’s police union
contract, officers do not have to answer any questions after a use-offorce incident for thirty days,302 and internal investigators must
complete any subsequent investigation within sixty days.303 Even if such
an investigation results in disciplinary action, all references to

299. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914).
300. Richard Fausset, Richard Pérez-Peña & Campbell Robertson, Alton Sterling Shooting in
Baton Rouge Prompts Justice Dept. Investigation, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2016), http://www.nytimes.
com/2016/07/06/us/alton-sterling-baton-rouge-shooting.html [https://perma.cc/4BZC-3EGV].
301. Steph Solis, Protests Break Out After Baton Rouge Police Fatally Shoot Man, USA
TODAY (July 6, 2016, 11:35 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2016/07/05/batonrouge-alton-sterling-police-shooting/86738368/ [https://perma.cc/36DW-2D47].
302. LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:2531 (2014) (stating that a police officer “shall be granted up to
thirty days to secure such representation, during which time all questioning shall be suspended”).
303. Id. (stating that “each investigation of a police employee or law enforcement officer
which is conducted under the provisions of this Chapter shall be completed within sixty days”).
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Sterling’s death will eventually be erased from the officers’ personnel
records in as few as eighteen months.304
As this Article demonstrates, Baton Rouge is hardly alone. Across
America’s largest cities, many police officers receive excessive
procedural protections during internal disciplinary investigations,
effectively immunizing them from the consequences of misconduct.
And so communities of color have taken to the streets to express their
outrage. Those victimized most by police misconduct have used
Sterling’s death, and the deaths of so many others, to remind the nation
that their lives matter.
Going forward, more research is needed on the relationship
between state labor law and internal police disciplinary procedures.
Future studies could compare the content of internal disciplinary
procedures created through the collective bargaining process with
those created through alternative processes. Alternatively, future
studies could compare the content of police union contracts with
collective bargaining agreements in other fields. These methodologies
could shed light on whether the unique structure of collective
bargaining plays any role in the creation of weak disciplinary
procedures in American police departments.
But even in the absence of this sort of definitive evidence, there is
still reason to believe that the public should have more say in the
development of police accountability mechanisms. For too long, the
law has excluded the public from the development of these procedures.
It is time to remove this process from the shadows and make the police
more accountable to the communities they serve.

304. CITY OF BATON ROUGE, AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY OF BATON ROUGE AND
BATON ROUGE UNION OF POLICE LOCAL 237, at 13 (2015) (on file with the Duke Law Journal)
(establishing a system for purging disciplinary records after anywhere from eighteen months to
five years, depending on the outcome of the investigation and the severity of the punishment).
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APPENDIX A: PROFILE OF MUNICIPALITIES STUDIED305
Name of Agency

Sworn Officers

Name of Agency

Sworn Officers

Abilene

170

Lexington

540

Akron

412

Lincoln

320

Albuquerque

864

Little Rock

557

Anaheim

374

Long Beach

786

Anchorage

374

Los Angeles

9,907

Ann Arbor

117

Louisville

1,252

Aurora

657

Madison

462

Austin

1,709

Manchester

223

Bakersfield

370

McAllen

266

Baltimore

2,779

Memphis

2,233

Baton Rouge

662

Mesquite

213

Beaumont

257

Mesa

812

Bellevue

160

Miami

1,148

Berkeley

168

Milwaukee

1,890

Billings

141

Minneapolis

836

Boise

259

Miramar

194

Boston

2,151

Modesto

207

Boulder

174

Naperville

160

Bridgeport

389

Nashville

1,389

Brownsville

245

New Haven

458

Buffalo

737

New York City

34,581

305. CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFO. SERVS. DIV., FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, tbl. 78: FULLTIME LAW ENFORCEMENT EMPLOYEES BY CITY (2014).
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Burbank

146

Newark

1,014

Carlsbad

110

Norman

171

Cedar Rapids

206

North Las Vegas

262

Chandler

315

Oakland

715

Chicago

12,034

Oklahoma City

1,041

Chula Vista

212

Omaha

793

Cincinnati

961

Ontario

228

Clearwater

230

Orange

150

Cleveland

1,476

Orlando

707

Columbus

1,852

Oxnard

241

Concord

151

Paterson

398

Coral Springs

200

Pembroke Pines

231

Corpus Christi

449

Peoria, AZ

180

Costa Mesa

113

Peoria, IL

209

Dallas

3,543

Philadelphia

6,410

Daly City

111

Phoenix

2,805

Davenport

160

Pittsburgh

913

Davie

171

Pomona

157

Dayton

361

Port St. Lucie

217

Denton

158

Portland

935

Denver

1,430

Pueblo

191

Des Moines

354

Reno

300

Detroit

2,318

Renton

112

District of
Columbia

3,935

Rialto

100
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Downey

108

Richmond, CA

180

Duluth

144

Riverside

364

El Monte

114

Rochester

713

El Paso

1,069

Rockford

280

Elgin

173

Roseville

119

Elk Grove

126

Sacramento

623

Escondido

153

Salem

181

Eugene

180

Salinas

135

Evansville

281

Salt Lake City

428

Fairfield

112

San Antonio

2,388

Fontana

183

San Diego

1,876

Fremont

181

San Francisco

2,137

Fresno

708

San Jose

966

Ft. Collins

196

San Leando

136

Ft. Lauderdale

501

San Mateo

140

Ft. Wayne

375

Santa Ana

264

Ft. Worth

1,536

Santa Clara

141

Fullerton

137

Santa Rosa

166

Gainesville

297

Seattle

1,323

Garden Grove

152

Sioux City

244

Glendale

386

Spokane

295

Grand Rapids

283

Springfield, MO

302

Green Bay

190

St. Louis

1,384

Gresham

120

St. Paul

627
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Name of Agency

1257
Sworn Officers

Hartford

420

St. Petersburg

531

Hayward

175

Stamford

278

Henderson

329

Sterling Heights

144

Hialeah

300

Stockton

371

Hillsboro

130

Sunnyvale

205

Hollywood

311

Tacoma

326

Honolulu

2,093

Tampa

952

Houston

5,252

Tempe

349

Huntington Beach 207

Toledo

615

Indianapolis

1,536

Topeka

287

Inglewood

162

Torrance

210

Irvine

200

Tucson

934

Jacksonville

1,576

Tulsa

765

Jersey City

790

Vallejo

101

Joliet

257

Visalia

139

Kansas City

1,398

Waco

248

Kent

136

Waterbury

271

Lansing

192

West Palm Beach

274

Laredo

442

Wichita

598

Las Vegas

2,485

Worchester

440

TOTAL

170,625
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Abilene
Akron
Albuquerque
Anaheim
Anchorage
Ann Arbor
Aurora
Austin
Bakersfield
Baltimore
Baton Rouge
Beaumont
Bellevue
Berkeley
Billings
Boise
Boston
Boulder
Bridgeport
Brownsville
Buffalo

Provides for Arbitration

Limits Civilian Oversight

Limits Anonymous
Complaints

Limits Length of
Investigation or Establishes
Statute of Limitations

Limits Consideration of
Disciplinary History

Provides Access to Evidence
Before Interview

City

Delays Interview

APPENDIX B: CONTENT OF COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENTS

Burbank
Carlsbad
Cedar Rapids
Chandler
Chicago
Chula Vista
Cincinnati
Clearwater
Cleveland
Columbus
Concord
Coral Springs
Corpus Christi
Costa Mesa
Dallas
Daly City
Davenport
Davie
Dayton
Denton
Denver
Des Moines
Detroit

1259

Limits Civilian Oversight

Limits Anonymous
Complaints

Limits Length of
Investigation or Establishes
Statute of Limitations

Limits Consideration of
Disciplinary History

City

Provides Access to Evidence
Before Interview

POLICE UNION CONTRACTS

Delays Interview

2017]

1/28/2018 11:13 PM

Provides for Arbitration
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Downey
Duluth
El Monte
El Paso
Elgin
Elk Grove
Escondido
Eugene
Evansville
Everett
Fairfield
Fontana
Fremont
Fresno
Ft. Collins
Ft. Lauderdale
Ft. Wayne
Ft. Worth
Fullerton
Gainesville
Garden Grove
Glendale
Grand Rapids

Provides for Arbitration

Limits Civilian Oversight
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Limits Anonymous
Complaints

Limits Length of
Investigation or Establishes
Statute of Limitations

Limits Consideration of
Disciplinary History

City

Provides Access to Evidence
Before Interview
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Delays Interview
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Green Bay
Gresham
Hartford
Hayward
Henderson
Hialeah
Hillsboro
Hollywood
Honolulu
Houston
Huntington Beach
Indianapolis
Inglewood
Irvine
Jacksonville
Jersey City
Joliet
Kansas City
Kent
Lansing
Laredo
Las Vegas
Lexington

1261

Limits Civilian Oversight

Limits Anonymous
Complaints

Limits Length of
Investigation or Establishes
Statute of Limitations

Limits Consideration of
Disciplinary History

City

Provides Access to Evidence
Before Interview

POLICE UNION CONTRACTS

Delays Interview
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Lincoln
Little Rock
Long Beach
Los Angeles
Louisville
Madison
Manchester
McAllen
Memphis
Mesa
Mesquite
Miami
Milwaukee
Minneapolis
Miramar
Modesto
Naperville
Nashville
New Haven
New York
Newark
Norman
North Las Vegas

Provides for Arbitration

Limits Civilian Oversight
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Limits Anonymous
Complaints

Limits Length of
Investigation or Establishes
Statute of Limitations

Limits Consideration of
Disciplinary History

City

Provides Access to Evidence
Before Interview
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Delays Interview
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Oakland
Oklahoma City
Omaha
Ontario
Orange, CA
Orlando
Oxnard
Paterson
Pembroke Pines
Peoria, AZ
Peoria, IL
Philadelphia
Phoenix
Pittsburgh
Pomona
Port St. Lucie
Portland
Pueblo
Reno
Renton
Rialto
Richmond, CA
Riverside

1263

Limits Civilian Oversight

Limits Anonymous
Complaints

Limits Length of
Investigation or Establishes
Statute of Limitations

Limits Consideration of
Disciplinary History

City

Provides Access to Evidence
Before Interview
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Delays Interview
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Provides for Arbitration
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Rochester
Rockford
Roseville
Sacramento
Salem
Salinas
Salt Lake City
San Antonio
San Diego
San Francisco
San Jose
San Leandro
San Mateo
Santa Ana
Santa Clara
Santa Rosa
Seattle
Sioux City
Spokane
Springfield, MO
St. Louis
St. Paul
St. Petersburg

Provides for Arbitration

Limits Civilian Oversight
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Limits Anonymous
Complaints

Limits Length of
Investigation or Establishes
Statute of Limitations

Limits Consideration of
Disciplinary History

City

Provides Access to Evidence
Before Interview
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Stamford
Sterling Heights
Stockton
Sunnyvale
Tacoma
Tampa
Tempe
Toledo
Topeka
Torrance
Tucson
Tulsa
Vallejo
Visalia
Waco
Washington, D.C.
Waterbury
West Palm Beach
Wichita
Worchester

1265

Limits Civilian Oversight

Limits Anonymous
Complaints

Limits Length of
Investigation or Establishes
Statute of Limitations

Limits Consideration of
Disciplinary History

City

Provides Access to Evidence
Before Interview
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Delays Interview
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Arizona
California
Delaware
Florida
Illinois
Iowa
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maryland
Minnesota
Nevada
New Mexico
Rhode Island
Virginia
West Virginia
Wisconsin

Provides for Arbitration

Limits Civilian Oversight

Limits Anonymous
Complaints

Limits Length of
Investigation or Establishes
Statute of Limitations

Limits Consideration of
Disciplinary History

Provides Access to Evidence
Before Interview

State

Delays Interview

APPENDIX C: CONTENT OF GENERALLY APPLICABLE LAW
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS’ BILLS OF RIGHTS
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APPENDIX D: METHODOLOGICAL DISCUSSION
This project would not have been possible without the work done
by previous researchers—particularly the excellent ongoing work by
Campaign Zero. Prior examinations of police union contracts and Law
Enforcement Officer Bills of Rights (LEOBRs) only received brief
discussion in this Article’s literature review. I offer this Methodological
Appendix to acknowledge these important studies and more
thoroughly explain the Article’s methodology.
I.

CODING SCHEME

In the methodology section of this Article, I described how I
“conducted a preliminary examination of the dataset, surveyed the
existing literature, and consulted media reports” in settling on my
coding approach. I offered this short explanation with little follow-up.
I write now to elaborate on my approach. In coding the Article’s
dataset of 178 contracts, I ultimately adopted on a coding methodology
that overlaps with that used by the volunteers at Campaign Zero at
various points in their examination of eighty-one large city union
contracts over the last two years.306 The coding methodology also
overlaps with the coding categories considered by the Guardian in their
evaluation of dozens of union contracts leaked from the Fraternal
Order of Police (FOP) server.307 This coding methodology overlaps
with that used by Kevin M. Keenan and Professor Samuel Walker, who
analyzed how LEOBRs similarly frustrate accountability efforts.308
And it somewhat resembles a coding methodology used by Reuters in
an examination of eighty-two police union contracts.309 This study also
benefitted from earlier work by Professor Walker, identifying how
specific union contracts and LEOBRs served as barriers to internal
discipline in American police departments. These important studies
provided a baseline upon which this study builds. My project would not
have been possible without their important work. Nevertheless, in a

306. CHECK THE POLICE, supra note 116.
307. Joseph, supra note 124.
308. Keenan & Walker, supra note 79.
309. Reade Levinson, Across the U.S., Police Contracts Shield Officers from Scrutiny and
Discipline, REUTERS (Jan. 13, 2017, 1:16 PM), http://www.reuters.com/investigates/specialreport/usa-police-unions [https://perma.cc/5US2-7V9E].
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handful of cases, I purposefully deviated from each study in defining
my coding scheme.
A.

Prior Research

The first, and most important recent study is an ongoing project
spearheaded by DeRay McKesson and Samuel Sinyangwe with the
group Campaign Zero.310 As of August 7, 2017, Campaign Zero had
coded a dataset of eighty-one union contracts and fifteen LEOBRs
according to six variables: (1) whether the contract “[d]isqualif[ies]
misconduct complaints that are submitted too many days after an
incident occurs or if an investigation takes too long to complete,”
(2) whether the contract “[p]revent[s] police officers from
being interrogated immediately after being involved in an incident
or otherwise restrict[s] how, when, or where they can be
interrogated,” (3) whether the contract “[g]iv[es] officers access to
information that civilians do not get prior to being interrogated,” (4)
whether the contract “[r]equir[es] cities to pay costs related to police
misconduct including by giving officers paid leave while under
investigation, paying legal fees, and/or the cost of settlements,” (5)
whether the contract “[p]revent[s] information on past
misconduct investigations from being recorded or retained in an
officer’s personnel file,” and (6) whether the contract
“[l]imit[s] disciplinary consequences for officers or limit[s] the
capacity of civilian oversight structures and/or the media to hold
police accountable.”311
Campaign Zero’s coding methodology has evolved over time.
Their earlier work looked somewhat more narrowly at a smaller
number of cities and considered fewer coding categories, namely
when a contract (1) “prevent[s] police officers from being
interrogated immediately after being involved in an incident,” (2)
“prevent[s] information on past misconduct [investigations] from
being recorded or retained in an officer’s personnel file,” (3)
“disqualif[ies] misconduct complaints submitted 180+ days after an
incident or that take over 1 year to investigate,” or (4) “limit[s]

310.
311.

CHECK THE POLICE, supra note 116.
Id.
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civilian oversight structures from being given the authority to
discipline officers for misconduct.”312
Similarly, George Joseph and the Guardian studied police
union contracts collected from a hack of the FOP. His analysis went
to print in February of 2016, and it found that many contracts
“included provisions barring pubic access to records of past civilian
complaints, departmental investigations, and disciplinary
actions.”313 Others attempted to “slow down misconduct
investigations,” “enable the destruction of complaints and
disciplinary records after a negotiated period of time,” and delayed
interrogations.314 It also noted at least one contract that required city
officials to redirect all complaints against police officers to the
police department for investigation, making it challenging for a
person to complain about police conduct with any sort of
anonymity.315
In 2005, Kevin M. Keenan and Professor Samuel Walker coded
the content of fourteen LEOBRs, examining in particular how
language in these statutes thwarted legitimate police accountability
efforts.316 Keenan and Walker’s coding, which included around fifty
variables, took note of several factors that particularly frustrate
accountability efforts, including LEOBR language that: (1) provides
officers with notice of investigations and waiting periods that delay
interrogations,317 (2) prevents civilians from making disciplinary
decisions,318 (3) gives officers access to arbitration during
disciplinary appeals,319 (4) establishes a statute of limitations for
internal disciplinary action,320 (5) limits the retention of disciplinary

312. CHECK THE POLICE, https://web.archive.org/web/20160209120722/ http://www.
checkthepolice.org/#project [https://perma.cc/ZFX4-7XZ6] (archived from Feb. 9, 2016)
[hereinafter CHECK THE POLICE archived].
313. Joseph, supra note 124.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Keenan & Walker, supra note 79.
317. Id. at 212–14.
318. Id. at 239 (“Kentucky, Maryland, and Rhode Island restrict the involvement of civilians
in investigating police misconduct.”).
319. Id. at 233 (stating that “arbitrators have a natural tendency to ‘split the difference’ and
give something to each side—a practice that results in systematic mitigation of punishment” and
discussing which laws establish such potentially problematic procedures).
320. Id. at 236–37.
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histories in personnel files,321 (6) limits the ability of civilians to file
complaints anonymously,322 (7) sets forth excessive limitations on
time, place, manner and other technical interview procedures,323 and
(8) fails to provide adequate exceptions to procedural rules for
emergency situations.324 It is worth noting that Keenan and Walker
considered additional factors, many of which they concluded did not
inhibit accountability efforts in the same way as the factors
highlighted above.
In January of 2017, Reade Levinson at Reuters published an
examination of eighty-two police union contracts from mostly large
American cities, as well as state LEOBRs.325 This analysis looked at
whether contracts (1) erased disciplinary records of officers accused
of misconduct, (2) gave officers access to investigative information
when they are under investigation for misconduct, (3) disqualified
complaints from being investigated because of either a time limit or
because of a requirement that the complainant sign a sworn
affidavit, (4) allowed officers to forfeit vacation days in lieu of
suspension, (5) permitted officers to refuse to testify to a civilian
board, or (6) required officer consent before publicly releasing
portions of officer personnel files. 326
Finally, Professor Walker has written a number of evaluations
of police union contracts and LEOBRs over the last several years.
In a 2015 manuscript published on his website, Professor Walker
argued that waiting periods that delay officer interrogations after
alleged misconduct are unsupported by existing scientific
evidence.327 Earlier that same year, Professor Walker conducted a
detailed analysis of the ways that the Baltimore police union
321. Id. at 240 (stating that “[l]imitations on the retention of citizen complaints and related
information pose a barrier” to accountability).
322. Id. at 239 (explaining how “[i]n Maryland, complaints alleging police brutality must be
duly sworn and filed by the complainant, a family member, or a witness within ninety days of the
incident,” and later arguing that “[n]o LEOBR[] explicitly establish[es] a right of civilians to make
complaints confidentially or anonymously.”).
323. Id. at 241.
324. Id.
325. Levinson, supra note 309.
326. Id. This study came out in print close in time to the date of my Article’s publication
and minimally influenced my coding decisions. But because it beat my Article to print, this
study deserves mention as an important additional contribution to this field.
327. SAMUEL WALKER, POLICE UNION CONTRACT “WAITING PERIODS” FOR
MISCONDUCT INVESTIGATIONS NOT SUPPORTED BY SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (July 1, 2015),
http://samuelwalker.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/48HourSciencepdf.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
6BNA-QGS4].
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contract and the Maryland LEOBR combined to thwart officer
accountability.328 In that manuscript, he argued that these labor
provisions impaired accountability by providing (1) “[d]elays in
[i]nvestigating [o]fficer [m]isconduct,” (2) limiting civilian oversight
by ensuring that officers can “be interrogated only by another sworn
officer,” (3) regulating the retention of officer personnel records by
“[e]xpunging [p]erformance [r]ecords,” and limiting discipline from
officers being placed on “‘[d]o [n]ot [c]all’ [l]ists,” and (4) limiting
the public transparency of officer investigations.329
B.

Choice of Variables for Study

After reviewing these previous studies and conducting an initial
examination of the dataset, I eventually settled on a coding scheme.
Admittedly, this coding scheme incorporates some personal
judgments about the relative problems posed by language in
collective bargaining agreements. But it also tries to ensure some
level of consistency with the coding categories identified by previous
studies in this field. In the end, I believe that this coding scheme is
consistent with existing studies. It reasonably distinguishes between
factually distinct categories of contractual terms that can thwart
accountability efforts. And I believe this scheme is written narrowly,
so as to avoid establishing variable definitions that unduly capture
too many ambiguous clauses. The discussion below describes the
definition for each variable.
1. Variables Related to Officer Interviews and Interrogations.
Most of the studies listed above took issue with efforts by police
union contracts and LEOBRs to give officers an unfair advantage
during interrogations or interviews. I ultimately settled on two
variables to signify the most common objections raised in the
literature. First, all of the previous examinations of police union
contracts or LEOBRs mentioned above took issue with language
that delays interrogations of officers accused of misconduct. As
Keenan and Walker argued, “[d]elays in the investigation of police
misconduct are intolerable. There is a widespread impression that

328. SAMUEL WALKER, THE BALTIMORE POLICE UNION CONTRACT AND THE LAW
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS’S BILL OF RIGHTS: IMPEDIMENTS TO ACCOUNTABILITY (May 2015),
http://samuelwalker.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/BALTIMORE-POLICE-UNIONCONTRACTFinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/HQJ7-W9RG].
329. Id. at 2–7.
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delays in investigations allow officers time to collude to create a
consistent, exculpatory story.”330 Campaign Zero appears to agree
with this sentiment, as they included this variable in their earlier
coding and appear to include it in their more recent coding as well.331
Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that, in cases where
an officer is accused of criminal behavior, the officer has a
constitutional right to secure a lawyer before the interrogation may
begin.332 This raises a tricky question: how long can investigators
delay interviews of officers after an incident without impairing
accountability? As Keenan and Walker observed back in 2005, there
is “no literature or scholarship adequately exploring or elaborating
this issue.”333
During my initial evaluation of the dataset, I noted that a
number of contracts provided officers with the opportunity to delay
the interrogation for a “reasonable” period of time, often until an
officer could secure representation. Others provided officers with a
set waiting time before which investigators could initiate an
interview (for example, twenty-four hours, or until investigators
have satisfied specific procedural and investigative hurdles, like the
interviewing of other witnesses). While “reasonable” waiting
periods to allow officers to secure representation could be abused,
in my estimation, waiting periods that designate set lengths of time
are more inflexible and therefore even more troublesome.334 Thus, I
define the variable “Delays Interrogations of Officers Suspected of
Misconduct” somewhat narrowly so as to only include provisions
that delay officer interviews for some designated length of time.
330. Keenan & Walker, supra note 79, at 212. Walker expressed similar disagreement with
waiting periods in his previous writing. See Walker, supra note 328, at 2.
331. CHECK THE POLICE, supra note 116; CHECK THE POLICE archived, supra note 312.
332. See generally Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967) (preventing states from
using compelled statements made by police officers during disciplinary investigations in
future criminal proceedings).
333. Keenan & Walker, supra note 79, at 213.
334. This viewpoint is reinforced by Keenan and Walker’s conclusion that an acceptable
delay provision may give officers a “reasonable period prior to a formal interrogation” in order
to secure representation, if needed. Id. at 214. A reasonable period of time may be between six
and twenty-four hours, but it should be able to be waived by the chief of police under some
circumstances. Id. In addition, departments should have the ability to “sequester” officers
suspected of misconduct during this delay period. Id. Keenan and Walker also observe how
departments sometimes interpret waiting periods that last a set length of time as the de facto
minimum waiting period for conducting all investigatory activity. Id. This, in my estimation,
suggests that it may be fair to distinguish between contracts that establish a “reasonable” waiting
period and those that establish a waiting period for a set length of time.
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Second, at least two of the prior studies raised questions about
provisions in union contracts and LEOBRs that provide officers
with access to information about an investigation before initiating a
disciplinary interview. Campaign Zero most prominently
recognized this in their more recent coding of police union contracts,
which examines whether the contract “giv[es] officers access to
information that civilians do not get prior to being interrogated.” 335
The Reuters study somewhat similarly defined this variable as
whether or not the contract gives officers access to “all investigative
materials.”336 The definition used by the Reuters study seems overly
restrictive in my judgment, while the coding definition used by
Campaign Zero seems to strike a sensible balance. The Reuters
definition potentially fails to capture a number of clauses in police
union contracts that provide officers with access to only some, but
not all, incriminating evidence an investigator may have against
them before interrogations. Thus, I ultimately chose to define this
variable similarly to Campaign Zero, as whether the contract
“provides officers with access to evidence before interviews or
interrogations about alleged wrongdoing.” In applying this coding,
I defined evidence to include something more substantial than a
summary or appraisal of basic facts about an allegation of
misconduct.
It is worth noting that I chose not to include a number of
interrogation-related variables that other researchers considered in
one way or another. I believe these generally do not present
meaningful barriers to police accountability. For example,
Campaign Zero takes issue with contracts that regulate “how, when,
and where [officers] can be interrogated.”337 Indeed, my initial
review of the dataset revealed many cases where union contracts
prevented officers from being subject to abusive or threatening
comments,338
unreasonably
long
interrogations,339
and

335. CHECK THE POLICE, supra note 116.
336. Levinson, supra note 309.
337. CHECK THE POLICE, supra note 116.
338. See, e.g., CITY OF BELLEVUE, AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY OF BELLEVUE AND
THE BELLEVUE POLICE OFFICERS GUILD 4 (2011) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (stating
that employees should not experience any offensive language or “abusive questioning”).
339. See, e.g., CITY OF PORTLAND, LABOR AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PORTLAND POLICE
ASSOCIATION AND THE CITY OF PORTLAND 36 (2013) (on file with the Duke Law Journal)
(“Interviews shall not be overly long.”).
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inducements.340 Some also provided officers with access to
transcripts or recordings of interrogations,341 or required that
interrogations happen at reasonable times and locations.342 On this
point, I tend to side with Keenan and Walker. They have argued that
“[l]imitations on time, place, and duration of interrogations are
reasonable, respect the officer as an individual and as an employee,
aid in the search for the truth, and pose no barrier to
accountability.”343 I also adopt Professor Kate Levine’s view that
such accommodations for officers during interrogations should
serve as models for how the criminal justice system ought to treat all
suspects.344 Humane limitations on interrogations, whether in the
context of the public or police officers, do less to limit accountability
and more to avoid “intimidation and fatigue that might lead to false
confessions or long-term hostility between the officer and his
supervisors.”345 These humane limitations on interrogation are
factually distinguishable from defined waiting periods, or provisions
that provide officers with access to evidence before questioning.
2. Variables Related to the Investigation and Adjudication of
Complaints. I considered four variables related to the investigation
and adjudication of complaints. First, I included a variable related
to civilian oversight of investigations and adjudications of
complaints against officers. Campaign Zero, Keenan and Walker,
and the Guardian each raised some concern about how LEOBRs
and union contracts can limit meaningful civilian involvement in the
oversight of law enforcement misconduct. Campaign Zero’s latest
coding views this issue more expansively as a problem of limitations
on “disciplinary consequences for officers or limit[ations on] the

340. See, e.g., CITY OF SAN ANTONIO, AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO,
TEXAS AND THE SAN ANTONIO POLICE OFFICERS’ ASSOCIATION 81 (2009) (on file with the
Duke Law Journal) (barring the use of “inducements” during interrogations of police officers).
341. See, e.g., CITY OF SALEM, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
CITY OF SALEM AND THE SALEM POLICE EMPLOYEES’ UNION 42 (2014) (on file with the Duke
Law Journal) (providing officers with the ability to have interrogations recorded, and have access
to that recording).
342. See, e.g., CITY OF TAMPA, AGREEMENT BETWEEN CITY OF TAMPA AND POLICE
BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC. 78 (2010) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (providing that
interrogations of officers should be conducted at a “reasonable hour, preferably at a time when
the employee is on duty”).
343. Keenan & Walker, supra note 79, at 217–18.
344. Levine, supra note 79, at 1236–41.
345. Keenan & Walker, supra note 79, at 218.
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capacity of civilian oversight structures and/or the media to hold
police accountable.”346 Keenan and Walker found that multiple
LEOBRs “restrict[ed] the involvement of civilians in investigating
misconduct,”347 and still others established hearing boards filled
entirely by fellow police officers—leaving no room for civilians.348
As they argued, such clauses are unreasonably “dismissive of the
public interest in police accountability.”349 And the Guardian
concluded that many contracts left out civilians from the
adjudication of complaints against officers, by ensuring that “most
of the investigations into police are led by officers’ supervisors
within the department.”350
I defined my variable somewhat more narrowly than the current
coding used by Campaign Zero, and more in line with the definition
used by Keenan and Walker and the Guardian. While civilian
oversight is certainly important, it is also necessary to cabin the
definition of civilian oversight so as to avoid creating a category that
groups together too many different policies. There is widespread
agreement in the policing literature that civilian involvement in the
intake and adjudication of civilian complaints is important for
accountability. There is more ambiguity, though, about whether the
public ought to have access to officers’ personnel files, officers’
personal information, or details about ongoing internal
investigations. These raise more complicated privacy issues.
In my judgment, the exclusion of civilians from the
decisionmaking process during disciplinary decisions is also
distinguishable from the use of arbitration, which I chose to code
separately as discussed in more depth below. 351 Given these

346. Campaign Zero’s earlier coding approach included a similar variable, defined as
language that “limit[s] civilian oversight structures from being given the authority to
discipline officers for misconduct.” CHECK THE POLICE archived, supra note 312.
347. Keenan & Walker, supra note 79, at 239.
348. Id. at 225–26.
349. Id. at 226 (saying that these procedures “effectively bar[] civilian participation in the
discipline oversight process.”).
350. Joseph, supra note 124.
351. For example, I would argue that arbitration is even more antidemocratic than vesting
the authority to make disciplinary decisions in the hands of a police chief. A police chief is
generally answerable to an elected mayor and city council, providing some layer of accountability.
By contrast, an arbitrator may not even be a resident of the community, and his or her decision is
often deemed final and unreviewable thereafter. Arbitration also generally happens after an
officer has exhausted alternative appeals of his or her disciplinary penalty. This provides good
reason to code these two variables separately, as they raise separate policy concerns.
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concerns, I focused my analysis in this area somewhat narrowly on
whether a contract “Limits Civilian Oversight,” defined as whether
the “contract prohibits civilian groups from acquiring authority to
investigate, discipline, or terminate police officers for alleged
wrongdoing.”
Second, I coded contracts based on whether they “Permit or
Require Arbitration.” While this sort of a variable receives less
explicit attention in the current Campaign Zero coding, 352 Walker
and Keenan expressed concern in their study about how arbitration
may unjustifiably reduce disciplinary penalties against police.353 This
is consistent with evidence and hypotheses from previous research.
For example, prior work by Mark Iris indicated that mandatory
arbitration contributed in disciplinary action in Chicago and
Houston being cut roughly in half for officers on appeal. 354 Professor
Seth Stoughton has similarly written on how collective bargaining
may contribute to lengthy procedures for adjudicating disciplinary
appeals, including arbitration clauses that may frustrate
accountability efforts.355 This suggests that arbitration is a
potentially important category for consideration as a standalone
variable. Thus, I included in my scheme a variable that tests whether
the contract “permits or requires arbitration of disputes related to
penalties or termination.”
Third, at least two of the studies described above object to
limitations on anonymous civilian complaints.356 Keenan and
Walker argued that policies that prevent any anonymous complaints
may not “address or deal with the potential for officers to intimidate

352. Campaign Zero did not appear to include a coding category for this variable in their
initial scheme. Their current category, which considers whether a contract limits “disciplinary
consequences for officers or limit[s] the capacity of civilian oversight structures and/or the
media to hold police accountable[,]” appears to be constructed broadly enough to include
arbitration. CHECK THE POLICE , supra note 116.
353. Keenan & Walker, supra note 79, at 233 (“Some observers . . . believe that arbitrators
have a natural tendency to ‘split the difference’ and give something to each side—a practice that
results in systematic mitigation of punishment.”).
354. Iris, supra note 113; Mark Iris, Police Discipline in Houston: The Arbitration
Experience, 5 POLICE Q. 132 (2002).
355. Stoughton, supra note 45, at 2210 (describing how an arbitration decision may be
improper, but unreviewable because of court precedent).
356. While Campaign Zero does not appear to have coding language that would capture
limitations on anonymous complaints, it has noted elsewhere that such policies are
potentially worrisome. CHECK THE POLICE archived, supra note 312 (noting in the text of the
website that bans on anonymous complaints are an additional concern).
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and retaliate against complainants.”357 I share Keenan and Walker’s
concerns,358 as discussed in Part IV.D of the Article. Thus, I included
a variable that considers whether each contract “prohibits
supervisors from interrogating, investigating, or disciplining officers
on the basis of anonymous civilian complaints.”
Fourth, I included a variable in my analysis that considers
whether the union contract “limits the length of investigation or
establishes [a] statute of limitations” on the imposition of discipline.
This variable mirrors a similar variable used by Campaign Zero,
which “[d]isqualif[ies] misconduct complaints that are submitted
too many days after an incident occurs or if an investigation takes
too long to complete.”359 It mirrors a variable considered by Reuters,
which identified contracts that disqualified complaints from being
investigated because of either a time limit or because of a
requirement that the complainant sign a sworn affidavit. This
variable also mirrors the analysis conducted by Keenan and Walker
on statutes of limitations for officer discipline. They found multiple
LEOBRs had such limitations. Based on this, they argued that while
“[p]olice departments should not be given an unlimited amount of
time to hold a hearing after charges have been filed,” officers
similarly should not be able to avoid accountability simply because
of a backlog of cases.360
In fact, “[s]ome activists suspect that delays in [the processing
of some civilian complaints] are part of a police department’s
deliberate strategy” to skirt responsibility for wrongdoing.361
Statutes of limitations can exacerbate this problem. There is no
uniform agreement among policing scholars about the appropriate
length of such statute of limitations. Keenan and Walker
recommend that investigators might need anywhere between ninety
days and three years to complete an investigation or hand down
punishment, depending on the severity of the infraction.362 But these
numbers appear to be based more on their independent judgments

357. Keenan & Walker, supra note 79, at 240.
358. These authors go as far as arguing explicitly that cities and state should “accept
anonymous and oral complaints . . . .” Id.
359. Campaign Zero’s earlier coding category for this topic focused specifically on whether
the contract “disqualif[ies] misconduct complaints submitted 180 days after an incident or
that take over 1 year to investigate.” CHECK THE POLICE archived, supra note 312.
360. Keenan & Walker, supra note 79, at 237.
361. Id.
362. Id.

METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

xii

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

1/29/2018 8:36 AM

[Vol. 66:1191

than on empirical evidence. Given the general lack of consensus on
this point, I ultimately included no time limitation on my definition
of this variable.
3. Variable Related to Personnel Records. Finally, virtually all of
the prior projects discussed above showed some concern for labor
arrangements that remove records of complaints and disciplinary
action from officers’ personnel files. Keenan and Walker pointed out
that LEOBR limits on the retention of information in officer personnel
files could be fatal to one of the most important tools for police
accountability: early intervention systems (EIS). These are “databased management tools containing systematic information of officer
performance, including, but not limited to, citizen complaints, officer
use-of-force reports, and officer involvement in civil litigation.”363
Police manager then examine this accumulated data to identify officers
that may be engaged in repeated or troubling patterns of misconduct.
Supervisors then subject these officers to “informal, non-disciplinary
intervention designed to correct their performance problems,” before
they elevate into something more serious.364 By removing officer
performance data from an EIS, union contractual terms and LEOBRs
may thwart this critically important misconduct prevention tool.
Additionally, the Guardian noted how some contracts that they studied
“enabled the destruction of complaints and disciplinary records after a
negotiated period of time.”365
I have signified this variable in a manner similar to that used by
Campaign Zero and the Guardian, as “Limits Consideration of
Disciplinary History,” which I defined as any contract that
“mandates the destruction or purging of disciplinary records from
personnel files after a set length of time, or limits the consideration
of disciplinary records in future employment actions.”
II. DATASET
The dataset of 178 police union contracts366 that I examined in this
Article overlaps with Campaign Zero’s examination of eighty-one
363. Id. at 241.
364. Id.
365. Joseph, supra note 124.
366. It is also worth reiterating that some of the contracts I studied have since lapsed and
been replaced with new bargaining agreements. I do not believe this is fatal to my limited,
academic endeavor. There is little reason to think that the content of the typical collective
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large cities and Reuters examination of eighty-two large cities. It is
particularly important to recognize the impressive work previously
done by Campaign Zero to collect dozens of contemporary contracts
and make them available online for public consumption. In doing my
analyses, I tried when possible to utilize the most up-to-date contracts
available through municipal websites, state websites, and record
requests. It is worth noting that the overwhelming majority of
municipalities discussed in this Article regularly post their
community’s most up-to-date collective bargaining agreements on
their websites or in state repositories.367 Finally, it is important to

bargaining agreements has changed in any systematic way from one year to the next. Given the
large number of contracts in the collection of 178 contracts studied that had at least one
questionable clause that could impede accountability (around 88 percent), I believe my study has
accomplished its primary objective. I have regularly updated the dataset and have added a
considerable number of contracts to my database, which contains over 1,000 union contract
documents from municipalities, most of which have populations of at least 30,000 residents.
367. See, e.g., City of Gresham, Oregon, Human Res., Labor Contracts, CITY OF GRESHAM,
https://greshamoregon.gov/HR-Labor-Contracts [https://perma.cc/5N3Z-N4VY]; City of Miami,
Dep’t of Human Res., Labor Relations, Collective Bargaining Agreements/Union Contracts, CITY
OF
MIAMI,
http://www.miamigov.com/employeerel/pages/labor/union_contracts.aspasp
[https://perma.cc/FBQ7-A9N3]; City of Minneapolis, Human Res. Dep’t, Labor Agreements,
CITY
OF
MINNEAPOLIS,
http://www.minneapolismn.gov/hr/laboragreements
[https://
perma.cc/48J9-DLJF]; City of Peoria, Human Resources, Labor Contracts, CITY OF PEORIA,
http://www.peoriagov.org/human-resources [https://perma.cc/P2AB-W46M]; City of San Diego,
Human Res., Employee Organization Agreements, https://www.sandiego.gov/humanresources/
laborrelations/agreements [https://perma.cc/X7V3-6MCM]; City of San Jose, Office of the City
Manager, Labor Relations Information, CITY OF SAN JOSE, http://www.sanjoseca.gov/
index.aspx?NID=505 [https://perma.cc/H5VY-QZXZ]; Municipality of Anchorage, Emp.
Relations, Collective Bargaining Agreements, MUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE, https://
www.muni.org/Departments/employee_relations/Pages/CBA09.aspx [https://perma.cc/C4QV8V82]; City of St. Petersburg, Human Res.., Labor Relations Division: Union Agreements, CITY
OF
ST.
PETERSBURG,
http://www.stpete.org/city_departments/human_resources/labor_
relations_division.php [https://perma.cc/X4Z2-BVKM]. Among the cities studied in this Article,
the following municipalities make updated copies of their contracts freely and publicly accessible
through either local or state websites: New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Houston, Phoenix, San
Antonio, San Diego, San Jose, Jacksonville, San Francisco, Austin, Columbus, Detroit,
Baltimore, Boston, Seattle, Washington D.C., Denver, Louisville, Milwaukee, Portland, Tucson,
Fresno, Sacramento, Long Beach, Omaha, Miami, Cleveland, Tulsa, Oakland, Minneapolis,
Anaheim, Tampa, Aurora, Santa Ana, Corpus Christi, Cincinnati, Anchorage, Stockton, Toledo,
St. Paul, Newark, Buffalo, Lincoln, Henderson, Jersey City, St. Petersburg, Chula Vista, Orlando,
Laredo, Madison, Glendale, Reno, North Las Vegas, Fremont, Irvine, Rochester, Des Moines,
Modesto, Akron, Tacoma, Oxnard, Fontana, Little Rock, Huntington Beach, Grand Rapids, Salt
Lake City, Worcester, Garden Grove, Santa Rosa, Fort Lauderdale, Port St. Lucie, Ontario,
Tempe, Eugene, Salem, Peoria (AZ), Peoria (IL), Sioux City, Sioux Falls, Elk Grove, Rockford,
Salinas, Pomona, Joliet, Paterson, Torrance, Bridgeport, Hayward, Escondido, Dayton, Orange,
Fullerton, New Haven, Topeka, Cedar Rapids, Elizabeth, Hartford, Visalia, Gainesville,
Bellevue, Concord, Coral Springs, Roseville, Evansville, Santa Clara, Springfield, Vallejo,
Lansing, Ann Arbor, El Monte, Berkeley, Downey, Norman, Waterbury, Costa Mesa,
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acknowledge other groups that have also made a number of police
union contracts available online, including Labor Relations
Information Systems,368 the Better Government Association,369 and the
Combined Law Enforcement Associations of Texas.370 Finally, I owe a
debt of gratitude to the research assistants who assisted me with
background research, data collection, coding, and open record
requests.
III. DATA PRESENTATION
Previous studies have adopted different methods for presenting
their data on the content of police union contract and LEOBRs.
When analyzing only fourteen LEOBRs, Walker and Keenan
utilized charts that placed the jurisdiction on the horizontal axis and
the coding category on the vertical axis.371 They likely made this
choice, in part, because they needed to represent around fifty
different coding variables.372 They signified the presence of most
variables with a “Y” (signifying the variable was present in that
jurisdiction) or a blank rectangle (signifying that the variable was
not present in that jurisdiction).373 While this sort of data
presentation is helpful, it would be impractical to recreate such an
approach for the dataset of 178 contracts studied in this Article.

Manchester, Elgin, Clearwater, Gresham, Carlsbad, Fairfield, Billings, Richmond (CA),
Burbank, Everett, Palm Bay, Daly City, Davenport, Rialto, Kent, Davie, Hillsboro, Renton,
Sunnyvale, Duluth, San Leandro, and San Mateo. Additionally, Nevada, Ohio, New York, and
New Jersey are just a few of the states that have established state repositories for local union
contracts. See, e.g., State of Nevada, Local Gov’t Emp.-Mgmt. Relations Bd., Collective
Bargaining Agreements, STATE OF NEVADA, http://emrb.nv.gov/Resources/Collective_
Bargaining_Agreements/ [https://perma.cc/E2XX-UQWC]; State of New Jersey, Pub. Emp’t
Relations Comm’n, Public Sector Contracts, STATE OF NEW JERSEY http://www.perc.state.nj.us/
publicsectorcontracts.nsf [https://perma.cc/TC2G-85NN]; State of Ohio, State Emp’t Relations
Bd., Collective Bargaining Agreements, STATE OF OHIO, http://www.serb.state.oh.us/
sections/research/WEB_CONTRACTS/WebContracts.htm [https://perma.cc/Z6HY-472Y].
368. LRIS Public Safety Contract Library, LAB. REL. INFO. SYS., https://www.lris.com/
contracts/index.php [https://perma.cc/7ZVE-8SVR].
369. Collective Bargaining Database, BETTER GOV’T ASS’N, http://www.bettergov.org/
collective-bargaining-database (focusing specifically on contracts for public agencies in the
Chicago region).
370. Contracts,
COMBINED
L.
ENFORCEMENT
ASS’NS
TEX.
(CLEAT),
https://www.cleat.org/contracts [https://perma.cc/3B89-4U9E].
371. Keenan & Walker, supra note 79, at 245 app.A.
372. Id.
373. Id.
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By contrast, the Guardian provided a mere written summary
describing the frequency of problematic provisions in their analysis
of dozens of contracts obtained from the FOP server.374 They
generally did not identify how they coded individual jurisdictions.
This may have been because of the nature of the data, as a hacker
had allegedly acquired the information unlawfully.
In my judgment, Campaign Zero presented coded data from a
large collection of police union contracts and LEOBRs in a more
useful format than any of the previous studies. Since Campaign Zero
has now studied eighty-one contracts using a coding scheme that has
varied from anywhere between four and six variables, they
organized the cities on the vertical axis and the coding variable on
the horizontal axis. They then indicated whether a variable was
present by shading in a box (or previously placing an image)
underneath each variable, across from the name of the city with such
contractual terms. This approach to data presentation is nearly
identical to that used by the Urban Institute in their coding of state
laws on body-worn cameras,375 and that used by Upturn and the
Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights in their coding
of municipal policies on body-worn cameras.376 It also resembles
that used by the Brennan Center in their coding of municipal bodyworn camera policies.377
Given that this Article examined a relatively large dataset (178
contracts) and a small number of variables (seven), I opted to
present the data in a manner consistent with the efforts by Campaign
Zero, the Urban Institute, Upturn, the Leadership Conference on
Civil and Human Rights, and the Brennan Center—that is, with the
variables on the horizontal axis, and the police departments’ names
on the vertical axis. I believe that this graphical format is superior
to the line graphs used by Reuters or the written summaries used by
the Guardian, which fail to inform the reader about the relative
frequency of questionable clauses in individual municipalities. I owe

374. Joseph, supra note 124.
375. Police Body-Worn Camera Legislation Tracker, URBAN INST., https://apps-staging.
urban.org/features/body-camera-update [https://perma.cc/QX2H-MTJQ].
376. UPTURN & LEADERSHIP CONF. CIV. & HUM. RTS., POLICE BODY WORN CAMERAS: A
POLICY SCORECARD, https://www.bwcscorecard.org.
377. Police Body Camera Policies: Privacy and the First Amendment Protections, BRENNAN
CTR. FOR JUST. (Aug. 3, 2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/police-body-camerapolicies-privacy-and-first-amendment-protections [https://perma.cc/W2J5-VYHT].
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a debt of gratitude to prior researchers for providing such a useful
model for presenting this sort of a dataset.
Nevertheless, it is also important to recognize the limitations of
this format. This coding methodology can lead to imprecise or
misleading graphical representations. I chose to code each contract
based on whether or not it fit within the parameters of the variable
definitions described in Figure 1. I made 1,246 coding decisions. Of
these 1,246 coding decisions, I identified around 5 percent of these
decisions as borderline cases. That is, in around 5 percent of all these
coding decisions, it was not immediately obvious whether the terms
of a union contract clearly fit within the stated definitions for a
variable.
For example, the Honolulu contract provides officers with a
copy of a complaint before an interview.378 Does that qualify as
“provid[ing] officers with access to evidence” before an
interrogation? The contract in San Francisco gives an officer access
to incriminating evidence seventy-two hours before possibly
undergoing an investigatory hearing interview.379 Does that qualify
as “provid[ing] officers with access to evidence before interviews or
interrogations,” and does it qualify as delaying an interview? The
Pittsburgh contract permits anonymous complaints, but requires
such complaints to have additional corroboration.380 Does this
qualify as “prohibiting supervisors from interrogating, investigating,
or disciplining officers” based on an anonymous complaint? While
the contract in San Diego purges disciplinary files after a set length
of time, it allows supervisors to consider some prior disciplinary
sanctions in future employment actions if the sanctions “show
patterns of specific similar police misconduct.” 381 Do these
contractual terms qualify as limiting the consideration of
disciplinary history? And what if a contract, like that in St.

378.
379.

STATE OF HAWAII, supra note 180, at 21.
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
BETWEEN CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO AND SAN FRANCISCO POLICE OFFICERS’
ASSOCIATION, AT 13-14 (2007) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
380. CITY OF PITTSBURGH, WORKING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY OF PITTSBURGH
AND THE FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE FORT PITT LODGE NO. 1, AT 126 (2010) (on file with
the Duke Law Journal).
381. CITY OF SAN DIEGO, supra note 159, at 54.
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Petersburg,382 Tampa,383 or Joliet384 explicitly reference or
incorporate a state LEOBR or a local ordinance related to officer
disciplinary
investigations?
Should
such
references
or
incorporations count for the purpose of this study?
Coding these borderline cases proved challenging. The binary
representations used in Figure 2, Appendix B, and Appendix C do
not fully represent the ambiguity involved in a handful of coding
decisions. In about half of these borderline cases, I ultimately coded
the variable as present. Nevertheless, there is certainly room for
reasonable disagreement in some of the borderline coding decisions
reached in this Article. Different coding techniques may have
resulted in variations in a small number of coding decisions.
Nevertheless, I do not believe that this limitation undermines the
central argument of this paper—that a substantial number of these
contracts contain internal disciplinary procedures that thwart
accountability efforts.
IV. CLOSING THOUGHTS
It may be helpful to conclude this methodological appendix with
a brief note on the limits of this project. This Article aimed to
contribute to an academic literature on the complex tension between
collective bargaining and accountability efforts in American police
departments. It hoped to provide useful background on the history of
police labor laws, explore how many police union contracts impede
reasonable accountability efforts, and ultimately offer normative
recommendations for reforming state-level collective bargaining
statutes. While this Article cannot claim to prove that the collective
bargaining process causes lax internal disciplinary procedures, it
bolsters the emerging hypothesis that the legal procedure used to
negotiate police union contracts can be susceptible to a form of
regulatory capture. This should inspire more research by future legal
scholars into the relationship between the collective bargaining process
and lax disciplinary procedures in American police departments.

382. CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG, AGREEMENT BETWEEN CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG AND SUN
COAST POLICE BENEVOLENT FOR POLICE OFFICERS AND TECHNICIANS, at 2 (2016).
383. CITY OF TAMPA, AGREEMENT BETWEEN CITY OF TAMPA AND TAMPA POLICE
BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC., at 81 (2016).
384. CITY OF JOLIET, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN CITY OF JOLIET
AND ILLINOIS FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE LABOR COUNCIL, at 31 (2012).
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Nevertheless, the empirical component of this project will soon be
out-of-date. Most police unions negotiate new collective bargaining
agreements every few years. Many of the contracts used in this Article
have already lapsed or will lapse in the near future. Those interested in
the constantly changing world of police union contracts in large
American cities should consult advocacy resources like Campaign
Zero, which continues to do important work on the frontlines of this
issue, as well as other police policy issues. You can access their
important work on police union contracts and learn how to become
involved in their efforts at http://www.checkthepolice.org.

